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Preface
Over the recent years, the research domains of development economics and economic his-
tory have both witnessed significant augmentations of their empirical toolsets to estimate
causal relationships. Differences-in-differences, instrumental variable methods and regres-
sion discontinuity designs (RDD) have now become standard techniques as a consequence
of what some decided to call “the credibility revolution in empirical economics” (Angrist
& Pischke, 2010). At around the same time, both research domains have also benefited
from unprecedented expansions of their available data. While economic historians have
tapped into the abundant reservoirs of historical maps and statistics, e.g. on education
(Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Becker et al., 2014) or income (Piketty, 2003), development
economists have been referred to the potential of remote sensing data, in particular night-
time lights, by contributions such as Henderson et al. (2012). Unsurprisingly, fruitful
overlappings between the two domains have since then followed (e.g. Michalopoulos &
Papaioannou, 2013a; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013b).
The recent advancements in terms of both empirical refinement and data provision mani-
fest themselves in the three contributions to development economics and economic history
that form the main body of this thesis. Each contribution corresponds to one chapter; all
chapters are self-contained and can be read independently from each other.
It is the importance of history for the formation of human capital that is highlighted by
the first chapter of the thesis. A large-scale natural experiment had instilled the country
of Poland with three different legacies of education. Known as the Partitions of Poland
(1795-1918), the Polish nation was divided among the empires of Austria, Prussia and
Russia, resulting in sharply diverging economic and social conditions across the parti-
tions by the time they were merged into a common Polish state again. While Grosfeld &
Zhuravskaya (2015) show that the past economic and educational disparities cannot be
detected along the former partition borders in present-day Poland anymore, I intend to
decompress the Polish history that led up to this important result in the spirit of Austin
(2008). The chapter is further greatly inspired by the notion of Wittenberg (2015) that a
legacy from the past is as much a product of history as a non-legacy, as any conceivable
outcome must necessarily result from some prior causal factor.
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Extensive data collection allows me to construct a georeferenced sample on historical
school enrollment, school supply and basic human capital covering the partition territo-
ries from the times of the empires to the height of communism in Poland. Using the
exogeneity of the partition borders for a spatial RDD along the Austrian-Russian and
Prussian-Russian borders, I find that the causal effect of the partitions on primary school
enrollment is initially large and unfavorable for the partition under Russian rule shortly
before the outbreak of World War I (WWI). However, I show that this effect disappears
within the following two decades of reconstituted Polish independence. The disappearance
is permanent, as there is no evidence for a rebound during the communist era after World
War II (WWII). Similarly, the backlog of the Russian partition with regard to literacy
declines over time, albeit at a slower rate than schooling, reaching negligible importance
in the 1960s. While my investigation suggests that changes in the population composi-
tion of Poland were of only minor importance, I provide complementary evidence that
the fading imperial legacies on education were accompanied by a substantial expansion
of the supply of educational facilities in terms of schools and their endowment.
The works that are most closely related to this chapter are Grosfeld et al. (2015),
Bukowski (2016), and Wysokinska (2017), who also make use of the partition borders
in spatial RDDs. Bukowski (2016) finds a legacy of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire on
education in the form of higher student test performance today on the Austrian side of
the former border. Complementary evidence suggests that it was transmitted through
positive social norms towards education resulting from the Austrian rule. This hypoth-
esis does not conflict with my results of a rapidly fading legacy, as I focus exclusively
on the extensive margin of education provision, while student performance relates to the
intensive margin of educational quality. The particular setting of the Partitions of Poland
is also the topic of Wolf (2005) and Trenkler & Wolf (2005), who study the economic inte-
gration of the Polish territories between WWI and WWII. The chapter is further closely
related to Dupraz (2017) who, while in the context of (post-)colonial Africa, also studies
the disappearance of a historical legacy in education along an arbitrarily drawn border.
From a methodological perspective, this chapter validates and strengthens the approach
of using the past borders of the Partitions of Poland for spatial RDDs in order to estimate
causal effects of the three empires. Specifically, I test whether considerable geographi-
cal discontinuities at the former borders, which have already been detected by Bukowski
(2016), translate into discontinuities in agricultural suitability. The latter might then
exert differential effects on the occupational choice and the returns to education on either
side of a partition border. This would hint at a potential invalidity of the spatial RDD as
it would be the discontinuity in agricultural suitability that is driving the discontinuities
in education instead of the empires. I make use of two well-established measures of agri-
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cultural suitability (Galor & Özak, 2016) and historical croplands (Ramankutty et al.,
1999). Out of the two, the suitability measure is indeed significantly discontinuous at the
partition borders. However, I show that the discontinuity completely disappears at the
Austrian-Russian border and shrinks to a minuscule size at the Prussian-Russian border
once the discontinuous geographical variables are added as controls to the regressions,
as suggested by Bukowski (2016). Consequently, all regression results reported in this
chapter follow this practice.
To the best of my knowledge, this chapter represents also the first contribution that uti-
lizes data that predate the partitions in order to perform a rudimentary check of the
absence of pretreatment discontinuities at the borders. So far, the literature has relied on
the assessment of historians that the demarcations of the partitions by the three imperial
powers were not based on any preexisting demographic, economic or religious conditions,
but rather followed military considerations or geographic features such as rivers. I com-
plement this assessment with quantitative evidence from a population census conducted
in the Duchy of Warsaw in 1810, i.e. before the finalization of the partition borders in
1815. After having georeferenced the data originally published by Grossman (1925), my
estimates show no significant discontinuities in (log) population at the future partition
borders. While population is arguably a crude correlate of prosperity, its utilization is not
uncommon in the literature, which is why I cautiously interpret the absence of population
discontinuities in the early 19th century as reassuring for the validity of the spatial RDD
at the partition borders.
More generally, this chapter contributes to the literature on the economic history of edu-
cation in Europe (Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Becker et al., 2011; Cantoni & Yuchtman,
2013; Squicciarini & Voigtländer, 2015; Dittmar & Meisenzahl, 2016). Further, it appends
to the literature on the economic history of Central and Eastern Europe, with Grosfeld
et al. (2013) and Markevich et al. (2017) in the context of the Russian Empire, while
Becker et al. (2016) focus on legacies of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
The second chapter of the thesis is concerned with the role of ethnic favoritism in the
highly competitive and ethnically diverse democracy of Ghana. It is motivated by the at-
tention that the field of development economics currently attributes to the phenomenon of
ethnic favoritism. Needless to say, investigations into ethnic favoritism have been largely
directed at countries and continents where ethnic identities are considered to be strong
and relevant. For example, Burgess et al. (2015) show that ethnic favoritism, as measured
in terms of road investments in Kenyan districts that are co-ethnic with the respective
political ruler, has been widespread under various autocratic rulers of different ethnic
affiliation, while it appears to have been curbed after Kenya’s transition to democracy in
the early 1990s. Kramon & Posner (2016), in turn, assess that with regard to education,
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ethnic favoritism in Kenya has all but disappeared under democracy. In the broader con-
text of sub-Saharan Africa, Franck & Rainer (2012) estimate large and widespread ethnic
gains in terms of education and health originating from time periods when an ethnic group
has been co-ethnic with its respective country’s leader. On average, these gains remain
unaffected by whether the form of government is democratic or autocratic. De Luca et
al. (2016) document widespread favoritism in terms of nighttime lights on the level of
ethnic homelands. Using a global dataset, they suggest that ethnic favoritism is common
across, but not limited to sub-Saharan Africa, with rather negligible dampening effects of
the quality of political institutions.
Under which circumstances could ethnic favoritism actually occur in a democratic system
of governance? As pointed out by Amodio & Chiovelli (2016), democracy can broaden
the scope for strategic interactions between politicians and ethnic leaders. The mixed
evidence on the prevalence of ethnic favoritism under democracy suggests that the out-
comes of these interactions might be heterogeneous with regard to the extent of ethnic
favoritism that they are able to provide (or prevent). From the perspective of economic
theories of democracy, the empirical prevalence of ethnic favoritism under democracy can
be related to the ‘core’ voter concept of Cox & McCubbins (1986): Political parties differ
with regard to their ability to redistribute towards different groups among the electorate,
while the groups in turn differ strongly in terms of their ideological party preference. In
equilibrium, this results in each party focussing its redistributive efforts on the specific
group(s) to which it can redistribute the easiest. Hence, groups are generally not courted
by more than one party, making them solid, delimited political blocks which enjoy high
patronage as soon as ‘their’ party climbs to power.
At first sight, the case of the West African country of Ghana bears a large similarity to
other nations whose democratization has been the subject of previous studies: Ghana
returned to constitutional democracy in 1992 in the course of the so-called third wave of
democratization (Huntington, 1991) after decades of alternating democratic turmoil and
military rule. The latter culminated in the eleven-year reign of Jerry John Rawlings as the
Chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council. Similar to the Kenyan experience,
Rawlings then formed a political party, the New Democratic Congress (NDC), and went
on to become the first democratically elected president of the Ghanaian fourth republic.
All quadrennial elections since 1992 have been considered free and fair; they have also
resulted in the first peaceful transition of power between the NDC and its main chal-
lenger, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), in the year 2000 when the constitution barred
Rawlings from running for a third presidential term. From the viewpoint of ethnicity,
Ghana’s ethnic landscape is as much a product of the arbitrariness of colonial borders as
many other African nations. The Asante, who have once been the rulers of the powerful
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Ashanti empire, exhibit a strong and long-lived ethnic affiliation to the NPP. The NDC,
in turn, has strong ties to the Ewe ethnic group, given that Jerry John Rawlings belongs
to this group as well.
However, it is questionable whether Ghana’s ethnic setup features the necessary precon-
ditions for large-scale redistribution towards the respective president’s co-ethnics because
none of the two politically invested groups is actually large enough to secure a majority
of the national vote by its own. This suggests that the two political parties rather have to
compete for the votes of the more unaffiliated Ghanaian electorate outside of the parties’
ethnic boundaries. This political constellation bears more similarity to the probabilistic
or ‘swing’ voting models pioneered by Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan
(1996). The essential prediction of these models is that those groups that contain the
highest share of non-partisan, ‘moderate’ voters will be promised the highest share of
redistributive transfers by the political parties because the moderates are the most likely
to ‘swing’ their votes from one party to the other in return for economic remuneration.
Correspondingly, survey evidence in Lindberg & Morrison (2005) and Lindberg (2012)
indicates a relatively high and growing share of swing voters among the Ghanaian elec-
torate. Evidence by Banful (2011) on the political economy of local budget allocations
by the Ghanaian central government further suggests that districts which exhibit tighter
vote margins in a presidential election receive higher allocations afterwards. Banful (2011)
does not explore any ethnic dimensions of these voting patterns though.
This chapter attempts to broaden the scope for the understanding of ethnic favoritism.
It does so by exploiting electoral results and changes of government in Ghana between
1992 and 2008. I first show that the two Ghanaian ethnicities that are co-ethnic with
the varying presidents become economically worse off in relative terms soon after the
country’s return to democracy. I then test the prediction of the probabilistic voting the-
ory that close voting should be associated with economic transfers if there are moderate
groups of voters to be swayed. I find that there is indeed a positive association between
close voting and economic prosperity, thereby confirming the finding of Banful (2011).
However, I further show that this association runs entirely through the homeland of the
large, politically unaffiliated ethnic group of the Akan, while it is not detectable with
regard to other ethnicities. Taken together, these results suggest that while the eagerness
of political parties to form multi-ethnic electoral coalitions has the effect of constraining
ethnic favoritism towards the co-ethnics of the respective political leader, the same eager-
ness can give rise to ethnic favoritism directed towards groups that signal their readiness
to be courted by the political contestants.
The chapter hence contributes to the aforementioned literature on ethnic favoritism in
democracies. It further makes a methodological contribution to the literature: Because
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there are no official statistics on economic prosperity at the district level, which is the
level of observation in the following, I make use of nighttime lights as a proxy variable.
While nighttime lights have already been extensively utilized in the context of ethnic fa-
voritism, I reaffirm the usefulness of nighttime lights for detecting patterns of favoritism
at the sub-national level.
Nighttime lights as one type of remote sensing data are also central to the third and last
contribution of this thesis. Their applications to economics in general and to development
economics in particular have been steadily growing over the recent years (Donaldson &
Storeygard, 2016; Huang et al., 2014), with the second chapter of this thesis apparently
being no deviation from the trend.
Therefore, the third chapter takes a systematic approach to evaluate the applicability and
consistency of nighttime lights in the development nexus. Although it is considered good
practice to test the applicability of nighttime lights to the respective research context,
mostly by correlating them against the variables to be proxied, the settings are so dif-
ferent and numerous that they are often not directly comparable with each other. This
makes it difficult to derive general conclusions about the applicability and consistency of
nighttime lights from them. Therefore, the approach of this chapter attempts to hold as
many elements of the empirical framework fixed as possible while switching single param-
eters on and off one after another. In order to do so, I construct a spatially harmonized
dataset from IPUMS (2017) census extracts. It allows me to examine the behavior of
nighttime lights along two important dimensions: Firstly, the level of spatial aggregation
can be shifted between the regional and the more disaggregated district level. Secondly,
the correlations can be estimated either by pooling all observations or by exploiting the
panel structure of the data. While the four resulting combinations are by far not ex-
haustive of the potential of nighttime lights, they still provide some clean-cut evidence on
the questions whether nighttime lights can be discretionarily utilized in different spatial
frameworks without loss of consistency and whether nighttime lights correlate with vari-
ables in levels as well as with their changes over time. Thereby, the chapter contributes
to the literature that intends to establish nighttime lights as a valid proxy variable in
many different applications (Henderson et al., 2012; Chen & Nordhaus, 2011; Chen &
Nordhaus, 2015; Hodler & Raschky, 2014; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013).
The findings presented in this chapter show that firstly, nighttime lights correlate strongly
with both the electrification rate of households and the average years of schooling as two
consistently measured outcomes in my dataset. The correlations confirm that, within my
framework, the applicability of nighttime lights as a proxy clearly goes beyond variables
which feature a somewhat direct relationship to the emittance of lights such as electri-
fication or industrial production, as the association of nighttime lights and schooling is
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equally strong in terms of statistical significance and also linear in shape.
Secondly, shifting the level of spatial aggregation from the regional to the district level
does not impair the ability of nighttime lights to correlate with the two outcome vari-
ables. While the district level is far from exhaustive with regard to the possibilities of
disaggregating nighttime lights (or other remote sensing data), the district is already a
relatively small administrative entity. This suggests that nighttime lights bear the poten-
tial to be usefully applied also within individual countries if the number of disaggregated
administrative units is large enough in order to provide sufficient spatial variation.
Thirdly, nighttime lights remain strongly correlated with electrification and schooling
even if a large amount of variation is discarded by estimating fixed-effects models and
identifying the parameter of nighttime lights only from within-region or within-district
variation. This suggests that nighttime lights are not just a stationary spatial feature,
but that they co-evolve with the underlying economic, demographic and social patterns.
Taken as a whole, the results of this chapter suggest that nighttime lights maintain their
consistency as a proxy variable when varying the parameters of the application systemat-
ically along the spatial and temporal dimension respectively. The assessment that night-
time lights correlate strongly and quite unconditionally with the years of schooling as a
measure of educational attainment might be interpreted as particularly encouraging in the
context of developing countries where disaggregated and consecutive educational data are
at least as rare as GDP-related data. The correlation between nighttime lights and school-
ing further calls for replacing schooling with rather quality- and skills-oriented measures
of human capital which Hanushek & Woessmann (2012a) and Hanushek & Woessmann
(2012b) deem as much more relevant and informative than the mere length of education.
In addition, upcoming new datasets of nighttime lights hold out the prospect of even




Human Capital in the Aftermath of
the Partitions of Poland
“Dla chcącego nic trudnego.” For the willing, nothing is difficult. (Polish proverb)
1.1 Introduction
The consensus of the empirical literature on economic history is that history matters (see
Nunn, 2009, for a review). The persistence of history and thereby the importance of histor-
ical legacies have been documented for institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Michalopoulos
& Papaioannou, 2013), human capital (Glaeser et al., 2004; Valencia, 2015), and technol-
ogy (Comin et al., 2010), to name only a few examples.
Indeed, it would actually be rather surprising if history did not matter: As Wittenberg
(2015) points out, any conceivable outcome must necessarily result from some prior causal
factor. From this perspective, a legacy from the past is as much a product of history as
a non-legacy. Considering, for example, on a large scale the fact that basic education has
virtually become universal in all western European nations over the course of the 19th
century, it should be evident that history mattered tremendously by turning more than
a millennium of persistent human illiteracy into a non-legacy.
In this paper, I highlight the importance of history for the formation of human capital
in the aftermath of a large-scale natural experiment that had instilled the country of
Poland with three different legacies of education. The Partitions of Poland (1795-1918)
divided the Polish nation among the empires of Austria, Prussia and Russia, resulting in
sharply diverging economic and social conditions across the partitions by the time they
were merged into a common Polish state again. Figure 1.1 displays the partition territo-
ries (a) within the national boundaries of the Polish state between 1919 and 1939 and (b)
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within the boundaries of Poland since 1944.
Figure 1.1: Partition territories within national boundaries of Poland
(a) Partition counties in interwar
Poland
(b) Partition counties in Poland since
1944
While Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015) show that the past economic and educational dis-
parities cannot be detected along the former partition borders in present-day Poland
anymore, I intend to decompress the Polish history that led up to this important result
in the spirit of Austin (2008).
Extensive data collection allows me to construct a georeferenced sample on historical
school enrollment, school supply and basic human capital covering the partition territo-
ries from the times of the empires to the height of communism in Poland. Using the
exogeneity of the partition borders for a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD)
along the Austrian-Russian and Prussian-Russian borders, I find that the causal effect of
the partitions on primary school enrollment is initially large and unfavorable regarding
the partition under Russian rule shortly before the outbreak of World War I (WWI). How-
ever, I show that the effect disappears within the following two decades of reconstituted
Polish independence. The disappearance is permanent, as there is no evidence for a re-
bound during the communist era after World War II (WWII). Similarly, the backlog of the
Russian partition with regard to literacy declines over time, albeit at a slower rate than
schooling, reaching negligible importance in the 1960s. While my investigation suggests
that changes in the population composition of Poland were of only minor importance,
I provide complementary evidence that the fading imperial legacies on education were
accompanied by a substantial expansion of the supply of educational facilities in terms of
schools and their endowment.
The works that are most closely related to my study are Grosfeld et al. (2015), Bukowski
(2016), and Wysokinska (2017), who also make use of the partition borders in spatial
RDDs. Bukowski (2016) finds a legacy of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire on education
in the form of higher student test performance today on the Austrian side of the former
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border. Complementary evidence suggests that it was transmitted through positive so-
cial norms towards education resulting from the Austrian rule. This hypothesis does not
conflict with my results of a rapidly fading legacy, as I focus exclusively on the extensive
margin of education, while student performance relates to the intensive margin. The par-
ticular setting of the Partitions of Poland is also the topic of Wolf (2005) and Trenkler &
Wolf (2005), who study the economic integration of the Polish territories between WWI
and WWII. My paper is further closely related to Dupraz (2017) who, while in the context
of (post-)colonial Africa, also studies the disappearance of a historical legacy in education
along an arbitrarily drawn border.
More generally, this paper contributes to the literature on the economic history of educa-
tion in Europe (Becker & Woessmann, 2009; Becker et al., 2011; Cantoni & Yuchtman,
2013; Squicciarini & Voigtländer, 2015; Dittmar & Meisenzahl, 2016). Further, it appends
to the literature on the economic history of Central and Eastern Europe, with Grosfeld
et al. (2013) and Markevich et al. (2017) in the context of the Russian Empire, while
Becker et al. (2016) focus on legacies of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 1.2, I outline the historical
context of Poland in terms of population and education over the timespan of my sample.
Next, I describe the available data in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 comprises my identification
strategy, its assumptions and a discussion whether the latter are likely to hold within
the framework of the Partitions of Poland. Section 1.5 presents my main results on the
causal effect of the partitions on primary school enrollment and literacy in Poland over
the period 1911-1960, followed by a concise series of robustness checks. I discuss the
mechanisms behind my findings in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Historical context
The Partitions of Poland represented one of many drastic watersheds in Polish history.
Between 1795 and 1918, Poland did not exist as an independent state, as the three neigh-
boring powers of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, namely Prussia, Austria and
Russia, had divided the territory of the large, but weakening Commonwealth among each
other. Only at the end of WWI, when the Austrian-Hungarian Empire had fallen apart,
the Russian Empire had descended into civil war, and the German Empire had been forced
to declare a truce, Polish independence was restored in form of the Second Republic of
Poland1, reflecting the sustained Polish desire for national unity.
However, Poland could hardly be called a unified nation in 1918. Its borders in the west
1While it was in fact an elective monarchy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth has been called
Rzeczpospolita (Republic) in Polish. Therefore, the reign between WWI and WWII has been attributed
to the Second Republic.
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were still to be finalized by the Treaty of Versailles, while its eastern borders were soon
to be redrawn by the outcome of the Polish-Soviet war in 1920. It was also still deeply
divided within, as the three empires had not failed to leave their marks on the Polish
lands. By the time the borders between them were lifted, the partitions differed substan-
tially along several dimensions, both materially and less visibly in terms of culture and
institutions. At the brink of their independence, the Poles therefore saw themselves con-
fronted with the task of consolidating the three former partitions into one national state.
This challenge was particularly pronounced in the realm of education, as the empires had
cared to very different extents about setting up an actual educational system: Primary
schooling had already been obligatory in Prussia and Austria-Hungary for decades, but it
had never even been established in the Russian Empire, creating a large disparity in edu-
cational attainment between the populations of the partitions. Consequently, addressing
this disparity became the prime goal of educational policy in the following decades.
The remarks in this section serve two purposes: First, I characterize the population com-
position of Poland from the time of the imperial partitions to the period of communism.
I do so for the reason that studying the evolution of Poland’s human capital within the
framework of the Polish partitions is negligent without paying attention to the simulta-
neous evolution of the population that inhabits the partitions at various points in time.
Skilled migration, for example, can have long-term effects (Hornung, 2014); therefore it
could obscure or inflate any partition effects on human capital if it occurred only on one
side of a partition border. On the top of that, the question of potentially selective migra-
tions from one partition into another is particularly relevant for the spatial RDD outlined
in Section 1.4.1. In short, the Polish population of the partitions has been spatially per-
sistent, making it valid for comparisons along the partition borders as history evolves.
However, it has become more homogeneous over time by the expulsion and extinction of
ethnic minorities. Second, I sketch the various educational policies that were in place over
the course of time.
1.2.1 The imperial period (1795-1918)
1.2.1.1 Population composition
The absence of a Polish state between 1795 and 1918 makes it necessary to rely on in-
formation other than nationality in order to characterize the population of the three
partitions. The literature (both historic and contemporary) usually infers the number
of Poles from either the mother tongue (Polish) or the religion (Roman-Catholic) of the
imperial populations. Based on this approach, a compilation of imperial census statistics
by Gawryszewski (2005, p.245) suggests that the population of the partition territories
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that are still part of Poland today was in majority Polish at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, with the exception of counties that bordered the remainder of the respective empires
where the population was more evenly mixed. The urban areas of the Prussian partition
posed another exception; Poznan was the only major city there with a Polish population
majority over the German inhabitants. In the Kingdom of Poland, the second-largest
population group consisted of Jews, while both Jews and Ukrainians constituted sizable
minorities in the part of Galicia that would remain with Poland after WWII.
Despite the pronounced differences between the three partitions, population movements
across the partition borders appear to have been a very limited phenomenon. While mi-
gration statistics are generally scarce in historical contexts, some publications at least
decompose a territory’s population with respect to its various places of birth. For exam-
ple, according to the Russian Imperial Census of 1897, only 1.3% of the inhabitants of the
Kingdom of Poland were born in a foreign country (Gawryszewski, 2005). Similarly, only
1.2% of the inhabitants of Galicia were foreign-born according to the population census of
the Austrian-Hungarian Empire of 1910 (Bureau der K.K. Statistischen Zentralkommis-
sion, 1914). This may not surprise given that the partition boundaries represented actual
national borders, which typically inhibit mobility much more than e.g. administrative
boundaries within the same country. In addition, Davies (2005) suggests that border
enforcement was particular harsh on the Russian side.
1.2.1.2 Education during the imperial period
Both similarities and differences between the three imperial educational systems are re-
viewed comprehensively by Bukowski (2016). In sum, the Prussian and the Austrian
systems were very similar to each other in terms of their local institutions, duration of
schooling, and curricula. In addition, school attendance was obligatory for the duration
of eight and seven years in the Prussian and Austrian Empire respectively. However,
these two empires differed sharply in terms of their respective intentions behind provid-
ing education to their Polish citizens: While the Prussian system sought to Germanize
the Poles by pushing back the usage of the Polish language in schools, the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire granted its Polish citizens the right to operate the schools in Galicia in
Polish language. As a consequence, while Prussia enforced high levels of enrollment and
accomplished similarly high levels of literacy (as measured in proficiency of the German
language) among its population, the schools in the Prussian partition were perceived as
a means of German oppression and forced assimilation by the Poles, resulting in sev-
eral protests and clashes at the beginning of the 20th century, when German nationalist
policies intensified. Cinnirella & Schüler (2017) document that within Prussia, counties
with a high degree of linguistic polarization were disadvantaged in terms of allocations of
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public funds for education. In contrast, the Galician schools were perceived as a means of
preserving and fostering Polish culture and identity; thus the Poles developed a positive
association to them.
The Russian Empire, in turn, combined a sparse provision of educational infrastructure
with a hostile attitude of the educational system towards the Polish citizens. Russia,
in contrast to the German and Austrian empires, did not introduce compulsory school-
ing prior to WWI; correspondingly it also provided few educational facilities. Further,
the primary schools in the Russian partition typically comprised only three consecutive
classes, compared to the seven and eight classes in Austrian and German primary schools.
Education was carried out in Russian language only; thereby creating a similar association
of education with oppression and forced assimilation on the side of the Poles as in the
German partition.
Some aggregate figures give a descriptive idea of the differences in education across the
imperial partitions: The population of the Kingdom of Poland amounted to 12.5 million
people in 1910. In the same year, the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria had 8 million
inhabitants, while the Grand Duchy of Poznan and the part of West Prussia that was to
become part of Poland after WWI counted 3.1 million citizens. However, the Kingdom of
Poland provided only 3,352 primary schools for its population by contrast with Galicia’s
5,580 and Prussia’s 4,450. This vast difference in school supply is reflected in the share
of primary school students among the total population; this share was only 2.3% in the
Kingdom of Poland, while it was 13.5% in Galicia and 19.2% in Prussia. Illiteracy had
essentially been eradicated everywhere in the German Empire at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury when the share of the illiterate population still averaged 59% in the Polish territories
of the Russian Empire in 1897 and 56.6% in Galicia in 1900.2
1.2.2 The interwar period (1918-1939)
1.2.2.1 Population composition
The Second Republic of Poland, at its core the composite of the three former partition
territories, could be equally characterized as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-
religious country. This applied in particular to the eastern territories that Poland had
annexed after the Polish-Soviet war (1919-1921), as these so-called borderlands (Polish:
Kresy) housed large groups of Belarusians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Jews. However,
these territories did not remain part of Poland after WWII; therefore I exclude them from
the following analysis.
The lands of the former Prussian provinces of Posen and West Prussia continued to house
2The high share of illiterates in Galicia was driven in particular by its eastern territories. It averaged
rather between 30 and 40 % in the western, predominantly Polish-populated counties.
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a German minority of considerable size after the Polish takeover. This was not the case
in Galicia, where the Austrian-German presence had historically been much lower. More
importantly, the size of the German population group in Poland’s west did not stay
constant after WWI. The emigration movement that took hold of the Germans in the
former Prussian provinces soon after the latter’s transfer to Poland is the object of study
of Blanke (1993). While the Polish constitution of 1921 granted every citizen the right
of preserving his nationality and developing his mother-tongue and national character-
istics, the auspicious constitutional provisions quickly became subject to interpretations
regarding whether they applied to entire minority groups, or just to individuals. For
example, German was never recognized as a second official language in the interwar re-
public. This created the necessity for German officials and associations to demonstrate
their proficiency in Polish in order to keep their positions and accreditations; a necessity
that many of them could not meet. Unrest among the German population therefore soon
resulted in emigration. How much of the German exodus from the former Prussian par-
tition was the result of exaggerated panic among the Germans compared to deliberate
emigration for economic reasons or forceful displacement remains a matter of historical
debate. Historians also attach a varying degree of reasonable doubt to the unbiasedness
of both Prussian and Polish ethnic population statistics. But that emigration took place
at a large scale is an undisputed fact (Blanke, 1993): The pre-WWI German population
of the Prussian partition and Upper Silesia amounted to approximately 1.1 million. By
the end of 1921, about 50% of it had already left Poland. Emigration continued during
the subsequent decade in significant numbers: As an orientation, the Polish population
census of 1931 reports only about 300,000 native German speakers (and about the same
number of Protestants) as remaining in the provinces of Poznan and Pomerania.
These population changes are reflected in the Polish population census of 1921, which
decomposes each county’s population in terms of its place of birth relative to its current
place of residence, similar to the previously cited Russian and Austrian population statis-
tics. Using this information, I calculate the share of each county’s population in 1921 that
was born in the same partition territory. This share averages 97% in the counties of the
former Austrian and Russian partitions, suggesting that very little population relocation
took place after the imperial borders had been dissolved. However, only 85% of the in-
habitants of the former Prussian partition were born on this partition’s territory. In turn,
8% were born outside of Poland’s borders as of 1921. While the census does not specify
the country of birth, it appears reasonable that many of these foreign-born Poles have
immigrated into the former Prussian partition from the neighboring territories that still
remained part of the German Reich after the Treaty of Versailles. The former Prussian
partition was particularly attracting not only because of its geographical proximity, but
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also because of the emigration of the German minority, which had created empty space
in both rural and urban areas.
1.2.2.2 Education during the interwar period
The first priority of the Second Republic with regard to education was to establish a
network of primary (or ‘common’, Polish: powszechny) education in the former Russian
partition where obligatory schooling had not previously existed. Consequently, efforts
and resources were concentrated on this purpose. Schooling statistics (MWRiOP, 1927)
indeed suggest considerable and rapid improvements in primary schooling in the central
provinces that are congruent with the former Kingdom of Poland. For example, the num-
ber of pupils in primary school rose from about 370,000 in the school year 1910/11 to
about 1,200,000 in 1921/22; thereby more than doubling the gross primary enrollment
rate from 19.4% to 48.5% over the same time span.
In terms of aligning the different school systems, the number of years of obligatory school-
ing was set to seven nationwide, thereby decreasing it by one year in the former Prussian
partition. Pupils were supposed to start school at the age of seven and hence to complete
their primary education at 13. (Krzesniak-Firlej et al., 2014)
While the schools in the former Austrian partition had already been run by Poles in
place where Poles constituted a significant population group, the integration of the edu-
cational system in the former Prussian partition posed more of a challenge. This has to
be understood in the contexts of the pre-WWI Prussian educational policy and the post-
WWI emigration process previously described: The educational system in the Prussian
partition had been mostly kept in the hands of Germans for fear of Polish nationalism
and separatism. According to Blanke (1993), the past German policy resulted in strong
drawbacks for the educational system after the Polish annexation. The Polish state, in-
clined to taking an equally uncompromising stance on the education of minorities as the
preceding Prussian administration, saw no reason to pay for German schoolteachers who
had previously been employed by the Prussian state. In addition, German teachers also
saw a sharp depreciation of their human capital because schools now used Polish as the
primary language of instruction. Germans living in the Prussian partition had had no
incentive to learn Polish prior to 1918, while Poles had already grown up bilingually, so
the former faced disparately higher obstacles to their integration into the Polish state that
had decided to treat the German language as disdainful as the Prussian government had
treated the Polish language. Consequently, the propensity to emigrate was particularly
high among German schoolteachers: Out of 9,000 residing in the former partition in 1918,
8,000 left over the course of the following years. This implies that the school system in
Poznania and Pomerania was deprived of a large share of its teaching staff after WWI. It
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became necessary to replenish it with Polish teachers first before operations could fully
resume.
In order to avoid assimilation, the remaining Germans turned to minority schools, to
which they were legally entitled. However, a minimum of forty school children within any
school district was necessary for maintaining a school; a requirement that became more
and more difficult to meet by the shrinking German minority. Together with the closure
of all German teacher-training facilities and administrative obstacles, this led to a decline
in the number of German-language primary schools in the former Prussian partition from
about 1,250 in the school year 1921/22 to about 480 in 1925/26. Hence, a lack of inte-
gration of the remaining German minority into the reshuﬄed Polish school system might
have depressed enrollment in western Poland at least during the first years after WWI.
1.2.3 The communist period (1944-1960)
1.2.3.1 Population composition
Jumping from the interwar period of independence to the era of communism in Poland
requires pointing to the drastic population changes and losses that Poland experienced
during and after WWII. About 5.2-5.3 million ethnic Poles and Jews are estimated to
have perished between 1939 and 1945 (Eberhardt, 2011), amounting to about 15% of
Poland’s pre-WWII population. Further, several million Poles were deported from terri-
tories that the German Empire or the Soviet Union had annexed. They were sent into
the German-controlled Generalgouvernement, abducted to Germany for forced labor, or
kept in remote areas of the Soviet Union.
However, the liberation of the Polish territory from German occupation did not yet end
the mass movement of people all across the Polish lands. In the Potsdam Agreement,
the victorious Allied powers decided to move Poland’s border westwards. Poland was to
cede its eastern territories to the Soviet Union, where they became part of the Lithua-
nian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics. As compensation, Poland
received the remaining German territories of the Prussian state that were located east of
the Oder-Neiße line. Due to their geographic location in the Polish People’s Republic,
these territories have been called the Northern and Western Territories (Polish: Ziemie
Zachodnie i Pólnocne). In the process of annexing them, their German population was to
a large extent forcefully displaced to what was to become East and West Germany respec-
tively. It was replaced by a mix of migrants from central Poland and a group of forcibly
resettled Poles from the ceded eastern territories. However, while the complex population
structure of the Northern and Western Territories is a promising topic of future research,
I exclude them from my analysis, as their boundaries do not intersect with the partition
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borders.
The population in the three former partitions, which now formed the territorial core of
Poland, was apparently much less affected by these drastic migrations, as census data
from 1950 shows that, at least at the level of provinces, on average more than 90% of
the inhabitants of the former partitions had already lived in the same respective province
in 1939 (GUS, 1955). Thus, despite the numerous population transfers during wartime,
large-scale population replacement was confined to the Northern and Western Territories.
The Holocaust and the expulsion of Germans raise the question to what extent these
events changed the ethnic and religious composition of Poland’s population. The com-
munist period makes it difficult to answer this question because of the official concept
of a Polish nation united under socialism. However, it is historically accepted that the
population of Poland has been much more ethnically homogeneous since the completion of
the major population movements after WWII. For example, Eberhardt (2011) estimates
that the share of ethnic Poles within the same pre- and post-WWII territories of Poland
already rose from 63.9% in 1939 to 85.7% in 1946. It further rose to 97.8% in 1950 due
to the continued expulsion of Germans and the emigration of Jewish Holocaust survivors
to Israel.
1.2.3.2 Education during the communist period
Needless to say, the loss of lives during WWII also affected Poland’s stock of human cap-
ital; in particular because both Soviet and German occupants specifically targeted the
Polish intelligentsia. Eberhardt (2011) cites evidence that about every third Pole with
a university education perished during the war. Educational instructors were decimated
with a similar bias towards the highly-educated ones: While about 28.5% of the university
lecturers died, ‘only’ 5.1% of the primary school teachers perished. Educational infras-
tructure was not spared the intense destruction of physical assets during wartime: In the
school year 1944/45, the number of public primary schools amounted to only 86.6% of the
number of prewar schools within the same territory of Poland. The fall in the number of
schools was roughly equally distributed across the country; only the province of Pomera-
nia operated less than 70% of its facilities in 1944/45 compared to 1937/38. (MWRiOP,
1946)
In addition, the prewar efforts to overcome illiteracy and to provide universal access to
education were set back by the turmoil of war and occupation, which had severely con-
strained any organized education for half a decade. This resulted in 1.4 million illiterates
among the Polish population in 1949 as cited by Dobosiewicz (1970). As a consequence,
public literacy programs for adults were provided over the course of the next decade.
Not surprisingly, educational policies of the People’s Republic were soon directed against
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private and religious schools; with the effect of eliminating the latter from the educational
sector over the course of the 1950s. After some regulatory turmoil in the early postwar
years, the duration of obligatory primary education was set to the prewar level of seven
years in 1949. It was extended by one year not until 1961. Educational institutions and
curricula were sweepingly harmonized under the socialist command. (Dobosiewicz, 1970)
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data prior to 1918
The existing literature has to the best of my knowledge not used historical data that
predates the partition borders in an attempt to test for the absence of pretreatment dis-
continuities. In order to perform a rudimentary test, I rely on population data that have
been collected during the short-lived reign of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1810. The Duchy
had been constituted by Napoleon I in 1807 and comprised, in addition to the core ter-
ritories around Warsaw, most of what became the Prussian partition in 1815 and some
parts of the future Austrian partition. While the process of the Partitions of Poland had
already begun in 1772, the partition borders were finalized only in 1815. They arguably
did not change considerably along the Austrian territory of Galicia, but they bore only lit-
tle resemblance to the Prussian-Russian borders drawn before the Napoleonic campaigns.
The population data are disaggregated into larger cities, as well as into small settlements.
They have been compiled and published by Grossman (1925), who also supplemented
them with comparable data on towns and cities in Galicia. Because I do not have a map
of the lower-level administrative divisions of the Duchy of Warsaw, I georeference each
observation individually and calculate the logarithm of its population as a crude measure
of the local prosperity.
Further, I assemble data on the state of public primary education in each of the three im-
perial partitions of Poland before the outbreak of WWI from Prussian and Russian school
censuses and Polish statistics on Galicia (Königlich Preussisches Statistisches Landesamt
in Berlin, 1912; Pokrowskoho, 1914; Pilata, 1913). Both the two censuses and the Galician
statistics refer to the school year 1911/12. However, not all available information is fully
comparable across empires. At the county level, the number of primary schools, primary
school teachers, primary school students, and primary school classes are least likely to be
affected by varying imperial measurements and definitions. I therefore select these vari-
ables for the construction of the imperial-era dataset. While private schools were quite
numerous and well-attended in particular during the imperial era, their presence and im-
portance were to an overwhelmingly degree confined to the major cities. Given that not
all of my sources report the number of private schools at the county level, I rely on the
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binary indicator for cities in my regression models to capture any potential differential
effects of private schooling.
Given that the Prussian and Austrian school statistics do not specify the age of the pupils
enrolled in primary school, I rely on gross primary enrollment rates, defined as the share
of primary school students among the school-age population, in the following. However,
their calculation is complicated by the fact that only the Prussian school census directly
provides the number of children at primary school age along with the number of pri-
mary school students. Therefore, I complement the data on the number of students in
the Austrian and Russian partitions with population statistics. The Austrian-Hungarian
Empire conducted a population census in 1910 that provides the corresponding data on
the number of children at school age at the county level (Bureau der K.K. Statistischen
Zentralkommission, 1914). The Russian Empire, however, conducted a population census
only in 1897 (in fact, the first and last census of the Russian empire). While I obtain fig-
ures on the county-level population in the Russian partition in 1910 from Polish sources,
these figures are not decomposed by age. Falski (1925) provides the county-level share
of children at school age among the population in 1897, with school age defined in terms
of the laws of interwar Poland, i.e. seven to 13 years. Applying this definition to the
Russian partition prior to 1918 is in a sense arbitrary, as there was no legal school age
in the Russian Empire. However, from the age statistics in the Russian school census,
I calculate that about 95% of the students in primary school in 1911 fell into the age
range 7-13. Therefore, assuming that the population share computed by Falski (1925)
did not change considerably between 1897 and 1910, I multiply it with the total county
population in 1910 to obtain the number of children at school age in 1910 and thereupon
the enrollment rate within the Russian partition.
1.3.2 Data on the interwar period
The importance that the Second Polish Republic attributed to education is reflected in
both the amount and the depth of data on schooling and educational attainment that has
been collected by Polish statistical agencies at that time.
The first complete and disaggregated picture of primary education in independent Poland
emerges from a series of publications by the Central Statistical Office (GUS, 1922) that
provide data on the school year 1920/21. This series is followed by a census of primary
schools collected in the school year 1925/26 (MWRiOP, 1927). Finally, the Central Sta-
tistical Office provides an annual series of school statistics starting in the school year
1932/33 (GUS, 1934).
Poland conducted population censuses in 1921 (GUS, 1927) and 1931 (GUS, 1938) re-
spectively. The first one contains information on literacy, as well as several classifications
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of educational attainment. The second one is less detailed, but continues the data series
on literacy. Consequently, I compute the share of the literate population above primary-
school age in both time periods.
The province of Silesia, which consisted of the eastern part of the Prussian province of
Upper Silesia, is missing in the census of 1921 because the status of this territory had
not been ultimately determined by the time the census was conducted. After its inclusion
into Poland, the province further saw numerous changes of administrative boundaries due
to its urban character and small territorial units. I therefore exclude Silesia and thereby
the only immediate, but relatively short Prussian-Austrian partition border segment from
my sample in all time periods.
Similar to before WWI, most of the statistical publications report only the number of stu-
dents enrolled in primary school in a given year, without providing information on their
age. Consequently, I continue to use gross enrollment rates which I calculate for 1921
and 1931 using the population census information on the number of children at school
age within each county. For the school year 1925/26, I compute the average school-age
population between 1921 and 1931 using the two census datasets in order to obtain an
approximate enrollment rate in 1925/26.
1.3.3 Data on the communist period
Population statistics on educational attainment and literacy are taken from the Polish
population census of 1960, same as the number of citizens at primary school age (GUS,
1965). I match these with statistics on the number of primary schools and students of
the school year 1960/61 (GUS, 1962). I rely only on this time period because of the
extensive educational information of the census, the reform of the school system in 1961
and substantial changes in the system of administrative boundaries soon afterwards.
1.3.4 Georeferenced Polish counties
The spatial RDD necessitates a measure of a county’s distance to the former imperial
borders. The Euclidean distance, i.e. the shortest line connecting two points if there were
no obstacles, of a county’s centroid to the respective border is a natural candidate.
In order to perform the corresponding calculations in ArcGIS, I mainly rely on a map
of the Second Republic of Poland (WIG 1934)3 for the pre-WWII internal boundaries.
The borders between regions in the west and the south of the Second Republic coincide
with the former partition borders, such that the latter can be easily reconstructed. While
3The map was georeferenced and publicly provided by Paul Dziemiela un-
der the Open Data Commons Public Domain Dedication and License. Source:
http://dziemiela.com/personal/polish_interwar_geospatial_datab.htm. Accessed on 29 June 2017.
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Poland, on the verge of its regained independence, adopted most of its internal admin-
istrative boundaries from the three empires that had previously demarcated the Polish
territories, several counties have been merged, split up, or rearranged in the course of the
decade from 1921 to 1931. I harmonize the boundaries for the sake of using the same
number of counties for each time period by drawing on an online repository of legal acts,
including administrative changes, of the Polish parliament (ISAP, 2015) and additional
georeferenced maps provided by the Mosaic project (MPIDR and CGG, 2011, 2012a,
2012b).
The county boundaries in 1960, likewise obtained from MPIDR and CGG (2012a) do
not bear close resemblance to the pre-WWII boundaries anymore. The former partition
borders now cut through a small number of counties, which I therefore exclude from the
sample. Keeping the bandwidth constant at 65 km, the sample size is reduced by only
one county at the Prussian-Russian border in 1960 compared to the pre-WWII sample.
However, it increases by 16 at the Austrian-Russian border due to the creation of new
counties. While it would be possible to merge some of the new counties in order to bring
the sample size closer to the one available for the earlier years, a larger number of obser-
vations in 1960 might actually reduce the risk of incorrectly accepting the null hypothesis
of a faded partition effect due to imprecise estimation, which is why I leave the county
boundaries unchanged.
The counties along the former partition borders within the changing national borders of
Poland that are included in my sample as a result of the bandwidth choice of 65 km are
displayed in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Sample counties within national borders of Poland
(a) Partition borders and sample counties
within interwar Poland
(b) Partition borders and sample counties
within Poland since 1944
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1.4 Identification strategy
1.4.1 Spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD)
The Partitions of Poland provide a promising setting for a spatial RDD that allows esti-
mating the causal effect of the partitions on human capital in Poland.
The basic idea behind a RDD is that if individual assignment to treatment is determined
by an assignment variable exceeding a threshold and if individuals have imprecise control
over the assignment variable, then assignment to treatment is randomized for individuals
just below and above the threshold. A well-known example from the literature on the
economics of education is that if grant eligibility is tied to student performance in a test,
then students are unlikely to have precise control over their test scores such that their
exact test score is random within a certain neighborhood. This implies that students who
score marginally above or below the grant threshold are randomly assigned to treatment
and control. Moreover, they are likely to be similar to each other in terms of both ob-
servable and unobservable pretreatment characteristics, rendering them valid comparison
groups. Indeed, if variation in treatment status is randomized around the threshold, then
all characteristics determined prior to the realization of the assignment variable should
evolve smoothly around the threshold. (Lee & Lemieux, 2010)
In the spatial context, the assignment variable is typically understood as the distance
of a spatial object to a multidimensional discontinuity in space such as a border. The
assignment variable exceeding the threshold then translates into crossing this border from
one territory into another, with the respective territorial affiliation corresponding to either
treatment or control status. Consequently, the causal treatment effect can be identified by
comparing observations on both sides of the border, but close to it. However, this requires
that the units of observation, for example households or firms, could neither deliberately
manipulate the course of the border, nor change their location as response to the border
in order to receive (or avoid) treatment. Further, it implies that the border had to be
constructed exogenously with regard to the spatial distribution of predetermined vari-
ables that influence the outcome of interest. Consequently, these variables should evolve
smoothly around the border (Dell, 2010).
In the geographical-historical context of Poland, the treatment variable is the identity of
the respective partition power. Given that no territory under Polish self-government ex-
isted during the time of the partitions, I consider the Russian partition in central Poland
as the control group in the following. The assignment variable is therefore the distance
to the two borders separating the Russian and Austrian partitions and the Russian and
Prussian partitions respectively, with treatment being assigned by crossing from the Rus-
sian into either the Austrian or Prussian partition. In order to identify the causal effect
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of the partition borders on education, these borders had to be drawn by the partitioning
powers in disregard of local conditions that would influence education. These conditions,
whether observable or unobservable, should therefore change smoothly at the borders
under investigation. Migrations across partitions, in particular if they occurred due to
more promising educational opportunities in the Austrian and Prussian empires, would
represent a form of manipulating assignment to treatment.
1.4.2 Econometric specification
The literature that employs spatial RDDs distinguishes a one-dimensional and a two-
dimensional parametric approach. In the one-dimensional approach, the forcing variable,
in my case an observation’s distance to a partition border, enters the regression model
linearly. Interacting the distance measure Distancei with an Empirei dummy indicating
the treated partition territory the county is located in (i.e. either Austria or Prussia)
further allows the effect of the distance to vary at each side of the border. Adding the
county’s longitude Xi, latitude Yi, and a vector of controls Ci results in the following
regression model that can be estimated by OLS:
yit = αEmpirei + β1Distancei + β2Empirei ⋅Distancei + γ1Xi + γ2Yi + δCi + it (1.1)
The parameter α then identifies the causal effect of either the Austrian or the Prussian
empire on the outcome y in period t, depending on the border at which the parameter
is estimated. The two-dimensional approach proposed by Dell (2010) is not interested
in the direct effect of distance to the border as the forcing variable. Instead, it uses a
polynomial of latitude and longitude f(Xi, Yi) in order to flexibly control for a county’s
geographic location along the border:
yit = αEmpirei + f(Xi, Yi) + δCi + it (1.2)
Given that I rely on county-level data in the following, the number of observations within
a reasonable distance to the partition borders is relatively small. It precludes the uti-
lization of more data-intensive nonparametric methods for estimating the effect of spatial
discontinuities.
The choice of the bandwidth in both specifications involves a trade-off given that a wider
bandwidth increases the number of observations and thereby statistical power, but also
casts more doubt on the linearity assumption on the forcing variable or the ability of
the polynomial to appropriately control for the geographic characteristics. For my base-
line specification, I choose a bandwidth of 65 km on each side of the partition border
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under consideration. Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015) and Bukowski (2016) choose nar-
rower bandwidths of 60 and 50 km respectively; however, their data are disaggregated
to the municipality level, thereby providing more observations. Similarly, the choice of
the functional form of the longitude-latitude-polynomial f(Xi, Yi) in the two-dimensional
specification invokes a trade-off: Raising the order of the polynomial increases flexibility,
but it also amplifies the threat of overfitting the data. Following the recommendation
of Gelman & Imbens (2016), I employ a (relatively low-order) quadratic polynomial of
latitude and longitude for Equation 1.2.
1.4.3 Validity of the spatial RDD
In order to provide a simple visual impression, I overlay the internal divisions of the Polish
state prior to its partitions with the final partition borders of 1815. Figure 1.3 shows
that the regional borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1770 (MPIDR and
CGG, 2012a) and the partition borders are hardly congruent and in areas where they do
overlap, they mostly follow rivers. Further, there is no historic evidence that the local
Figure 1.3: Borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and partition borders
Polish population along the partition borders had any possibility for manipulating their
assignment to treatment, i.e. for influencing the decision on which side of an imperial
border their municipality or city would be located after 1815. Indeed, the absolutist
character of the three empires at the time when they agreed upon the partitions makes
it unlikely that their subjects were granted any say in these decisions.
Next, I present evidence on potential pretreatment discontinuities in terms of the parti-
tions’ (log) population in 1810. Results from estimating the one-dimensional RDD do not
indicate the existence of such discontinuities (Table 1.1). While there is a statistically
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significant estimate at the Austrian border (column 5) when all observations on both
sides of the border are included, the significance vanishes as soon as bandwidths narrower
than 100km on each side of the border are chosen. Switching to the two-dimensional
specification (Table 1.2) does not yield any significant estimate.
Table 1.1: Log population at partition borders in 1810 (One-dimensional RDD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable Log Population in 1810
Prussian Side = 1 0.036 -0.126 0.078 -0.017
(0.137) (0.184) (0.234) (0.267)
Austrian Side = 1 0.323** 0.247 0.131 0.077
(0.141) (0.157) (0.184) (0.219)
Observations 621 245 165 137 621 251 187 145
R-squared 0.140 0.125 0.136 0.076 0.152 0.163 0.198 0.227
Distance, Distance*Partition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude/Longitude, City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth . 100km 65km 50km . 100km 65km 50km
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.2: Log population at partition borders in 1810 (Two-dimensional RDD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable Log Population in 1810
Prussian Side = 1 -0.088 -0.120 -0.002 -0.064
(0.148) (0.179) (0.220) (0.237)
Austrian Side = 1 0.119 0.251 0.195 0.263
(0.141) (0.155) (0.184) (0.204)
Observations 538 245 165 137 470 251 187 145
R-squared 0.128 0.136 0.147 0.077 0.183 0.179 0.217 0.243
2nd order Polynomial, City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth . 100km 65km 50km . 100km 65km 50km
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
While I am aware of the simplicity of my pretreatment measure, it gives no evident rea-
son to question the smoothness of the population distribution at the designated partition
borders before 1815. In addition, the claim of the exogeneity of the partition borders
is supported by Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015), who review numerous historical sources
that suggest that the partition borders did not reflect preexisting economic, ethnic or
religious divisions.
While the pretreatment distribution of variables such as education or income cannot be
tested, it is common practice to check whether geographical characteristics are smooth at
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the borders of interest. Discontinuities in geography may indicate that local geography
played a role in constructing the border and might therefore confound the outcome. I
test for geographical discontinuities by estimating Equation 1.1 and Equation 1.2 with
altitude, precipitation, and temperature as the left-hand-side variables respectively. Data
for the three variables are obtained from WorldClim 1.4 (Hijmans et al., 2005). Results
are reported in Table 1.3. Using a bandwidth of 65 kilometers, I find statistically sig-
nificant discontinuities in all three geographic variables at the Austrian-Russian partition
border in both the one- (Panel A) and the two-dimensional (Panel B) regression design.
My estimates are of similar magnitude to those of Bukowski (2016), who refers the dis-
continuities to the local riverbed of the Vistula. Indeed, when plotting the three variables
against the distance to the border, it becomes apparent that altitude and precipitation
actually steadily increase on both sides of the border despite the negative sign of the
Austrian partition coefficient (Figure A.1 in the appendix to this chapter). This suggests
that while counties on the Austrian side of the border are on average more elevated than
those on the Russian side, the partition border does not reflect an abrupt change that
lifts all observations on the Austrian territory to a different level of altitude. The discon-
tinuities in geography are smaller and mostly insignificant across the Prussian-Russian
border (Panel C), except for temperature in the two-dimensional specification (Panel D).
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Table 1.3: Discontinuities in geographic characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Altitude (m) Precipitation (mm) Temperature (○C)
Austrian-Russian Border
Panel A: One-Dimensional RDD
Austrian Side = 1 -102.805*** -94.181*** -31.772 -31.391** 0.631*** 0.549***
(34.641) (29.948) (34.414) (13.800) (0.168) (0.164)
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44
R-squared 0.370 0.647 0.417 0.909 0.403 0.492
Distance, Distance*Austrian Side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Two-dimensional RDD
Austrian Side = 1 -117.012*** -110.687*** -48.946*** -46.137*** 0.657*** 0.631***
(29.096) (28.448) (9.216) (8.907) (0.164) (0.164)
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44
R-squared 0.741 0.760 0.960 0.965 0.484 0.498
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prussian-Russian Border
Panel C: One-Dimensional RDD
Prussian Side = 1 11.001 1.221 0.021 -2.993 -0.047 -0.051
(16.798) (8.568) (15.112) (8.610) (0.290) (0.063)
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
R-squared 0.213 0.802 0.003 0.651 0.010 0.950
Distance, Distance*Prussian Side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Two-dimensional RDD
Prussian Side = 1 10.694 11.253 -0.737 -0.483 -0.133** -0.136**
(9.330) (8.501) (6.940) (6.742) (0.065) (0.060)
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54
R-squared 0.714 0.792 0.664 0.701 0.916 0.933
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: One- and two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
It appears unlikely that altitude or precipitation have any direct effect on e.g. school
construction or education. However, the geographic discontinuities might reflect similar
discontinuities in agricultural suitability of the territories in my sample. Agricultural
suitability, in turn, might affect the opportunity cost of schooling both before and after
the erection of the partition borders. I test for discontinuities in agricultural suitability
by proxying the latter first with the Caloric Suitability Index (CSI) by Galor & Özak
(2016) and second with the historical croplands dataset by Ramankutty et al.(1999). The
CSI provides four grid cell-level estimates of caloric suitability: Average potential caloric
yield attainable given the set of crops that are suitable for cultivation pre-/post-1500CE
and maximum potential caloric yield attainable given the set of crops that are suitable
for cultivation pre-/post-1500CE. I select the two estimates that refer to the post-1500CE
era. The historical croplands dataset ignores potential or actual yields and instead
provides estimates of permanent cropland areas (as the share of cropland in a grid cell’s
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total land cover) over several centuries, from which I select the years 1800 and 1900.
Results are presented in Table 1.4. The estimated discontinuity in both average and
potential crop yields are large and significant at the Russian-Austrian border in both
RDDs, suggesting a substantially higher yield at the Austrian side (columns 1 and 3 in
Panel A and B). However, the effect becomes negative and insignificant when altitude,
precipitation, and temperature are included as geographic controls (columns 2 and 4).
Table 1.4: Discontinuities in agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable Average Caloric Yield Optimal Caloric Yield Cropland 1800 Cropland 1900
Austrian-Russian Border
Panel A: One-Dimensional RDD
Austrian Side = 1 186.077** -18.295 407.150* -70.439 -0.017 -0.069 -0.033 -0.101
(91.586) (56.696) (229.682) (154.235) (0.047) (0.045) (0.060) (0.060)
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
R-squared 0.405 0.830 0.446 0.790 0.538 0.770 0.500 0.751
Distance, Distance*Austrian Side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude/Longitude, City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B: Two-dimensional RDD
Austrian Side = 1 199.198*** -21.583 498.364*** 60.065 0.015 -0.015 0.014 -0.026
(61.451) (21.751) (127.118) (81.472) (0.032) (0.042) (0.042) (0.056)
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
R-squared 0.663 0.950 0.706 0.949 0.818 0.828 0.791 0.804
2nd Order Polynomial, City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Prussian-Russian Border
Panel C: One-Dimensional RDD
Prussian Side = 1 -80.511* -90.582** -227.352* -214.485** 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.012
(45.155) (36.098) (118.438) (103.037) (0.019) (0.016) (0.025) (0.021)
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
R-squared 0.636 0.745 0.650 0.753 0.417 0.566 0.411 0.562
Distance, Distance*Prussian Side Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latitude/Longitude, City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel D: Two-dimensional RDD
Prussian Side = 1 -45.711* -27.849 -197.538** -82.676 -0.020 -0.014 -0.027 -0.019
(23.579) (20.215) (81.034) (61.883) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026)
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
R-squared 0.882 0.918 0.801 0.902 0.529 0.579 0.529 0.576
2nd Order Polynomial, City Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: One- and two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
At the Prussian-Russian border, the effect on crop yield is negative and significant in
the one-dimensional specification both with and without the geographic controls (Panel
C), while the latter render the effect insignificant in the two-dimensional specification
(Panel D). The negative effect in the one-dimensional specification is hardly of economic
importance: For example, average caloric yield is 2,025 at the Prussian-Russian border;
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the estimated discontinuity of 91 amounts to less than five percent of this average. This
difference is unlikely to account for the large differences in schooling between the Prus-
sian and the Russian partition. In addition, both employment in agriculture and school
enrollment were more prevalent in the Prussian partition than in the Kingdom of Poland
during the imperial era, which does not hint at a relevant trade-off between the two.
Furthermore, there are no statistically significant discontinuities in historical cropland
at any border neither in 1800 nor 1900 (columns 5-8). Nevertheless, I include all three
geographic variables as controls in the following regressions for both borders.
The relevance of population movements as a threat to identification has already been
discussed in Section 1.2.1.1: There is no evidence for selective migrations (or large migra-
tions of any kind) across the various partitions borders during the imperial era, implying
a very limited potential for treatment status manipulation.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Main results
Table 1.5 presents estimates of the discontinuity in primary enrollment at the Prussian-
Russian partition border over the years 1911 to 1961 using the two-dimensional RDD.4 In
addition to the estimates of the partition effect, I also report the mean of the dependent
variable at the Russian side of the border for each time period in the sample. Keeping the
bandwidth fixed at 65 kilometers, primary enrollment is estimated to be more than 80 pp
higher in the Prussian partition in 1911/12 when the empires were still existent. Less than
ten years later and two years in the reinstated Polish Republic, the difference is roughly
cut in half. Both findings are consistent with the descriptives cited in Section 1.2.1.2.
The partition effect further falls below 10 pp in 1925/26 and loses significance, while it
shows a slight rebound in 1931/32 before it fades entirely in 1960/61. The various controls
for longitude/latitude, cities and geography increase the precision of the estimates, but
they do not impact their size. Besides the partition effect, the steadily increasing mean of
enrollment in the Russian partition over time further suggests that the dwindling partition
effect is indeed the result of increasing enrollment in the Russian partition instead of a
potential convergence of both partitions to a rather mediocre level of enrollment: In
1931/32, (gross) primary enrollment averages already close to 100 percent in the Russian
partition. I visualize the development of the Prussian partition effect across four of the
five time periods in Figure 1.4.
4Estimating the one-dimensional specification delivers very similar results and because the distance
to the border is not of particular interest in my setting, I delegate all results obtained from the one-
dimensional RDD to the appendix to this chapter.
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Table 1.5: Primary enrollment at Prussian-Russian border 1911-1961
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Prussian Side = 1 0.822*** 0.822*** 0.832***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.997
Mean on Russian Side 0.164 0.164 0.164
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.378***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.875 0.888 0.902
Mean on Russian Side 0.562 0.562 0.562
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Prussian Side = 1 0.060 0.064* 0.066*
(0.040) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.185 0.645 0.647
Mean on Russian Side 0.711 0.711 0.711
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Prussian Side = 1 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.098***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.410 0.528 0.550
Mean on Russian Side 0.961 0.961 0.961
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961
Prussian Side = 1 -0.027 -0.027 -0.031
(0.026) (0.027) (0.037)
Observations 53 53 53
R-squared 0.183 0.187 0.215
Mean on Russian Side 1.081 1.081 1.081
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
City Dummy No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.4: Discontinuities in primary enrollment at Prussian-Russian border
Y axis: Share of primary enrollment. X axis: Distance to the border in kilometers. Negative distance
indicates Russian partition. Bandwidth: 65km.
The estimated effect of the discontinuity in enrollment at the Austrian-Russian border
(Table 1.6) is of smaller magnitude in 1911/12 in comparison with the Prussian partition
effect, reflecting the fact that school attendance in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was
not nearly as universal as in Prussia. Nevertheless, the effect still amounts to about 50
pp. Moreover, the temporal pattern of decreasing relevance of the partitions is strictly
monotonic at the Austrian-Russian border: With every subsequent time period, the
estimated effect becomes smaller in magnitude; in 1931/32, it is not anymore statistically
different from zero and it shows no sign of a resurgence in 1960/61. The controls do not
alter this pattern; only the geographic controls render the effect insignificant already in
1925/26. Given that enrollment averages 98% in 1931/32, the counties on both sides of
the Austrian-Russian partition border appear to converge to a high level of enrollment.
A graphical representation of the results can be found in Figure 1.5.
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Table 1.6: Primary enrollment at Austrian-Russian border 1911-1961
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Austrian Side = 1 0.495*** 0.499*** 0.400***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.043)
Observations 43 43 43
R-squared 0.926 0.927 0.945
Mean on Russian Side 0.194 0.194 0.194
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.226*** 0.232*** 0.156***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.045)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.835 0.838 0.870
Mean on Russian Side 0.554 0.554 0.554
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Austrian Side = 1 0.101** 0.100** 0.028
(0.044) (0.047) (0.050)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.381 0.382 0.428
Mean on Russian Side 0.627 0.627 0.627
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Austrian Side = 1 -0.007 0.005 -0.009
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.441 0.653 0.662
Mean on Russian Side 0.981 0.981 0.981
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961
Austrian Side = 1 -0.012 -0.010 -0.002
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Observations 59 59 59
R-squared 0.114 0.139 0.192
Mean on Russian Side 1.062 1.062 1.062
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
City Dummy No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. 65 km bandwidth. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.5: Discontinuities in primary enrollment at Austrian-Russian border
Y axis: Share of primary enrollment. X axis: Distance to the border in kilometers. Negative distance
indicates Russian partition. Bandwidth: 65km.
The effect of the partitions on literacy as a measure of accumulated human capital turns
out to be more persistent. Table 1.7 shows that literacy in 1921 is 25 pp higher on
the Prussian side of the partition border than on the Russian one. Interestingly, liter-
acy among the population of the former Prussian partition is far from universal in 1921,
but amounts to only 75%. This may suggest that prior to WWI, universal attendance
of a (German-speaking) school and thereby proficiency in the German language did not
translate into a comparable spoken and written proficiency of the Polish language, de-
spite private efforts and initiatives of the Polish population. The literacy advantage of
the Prussian partition narrows by only 5 pp in 1931. Thirty years later, it is not sta-
tistically different from zero anymore. The corresponding graphs of the evolution of the
discontinuity in literacy at the Prussian-Russian border are shown in Figure 1.6.
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Table 1.7: Literacy at Prussian-Russian border 1921-1960
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.246*** 0.245*** 0.244***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.942 0.960 0.967
Mean on Russian Side 0.509 0.509 0.509
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931
Prussian Side = 1 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.192***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.954 0.973 0.976
Mean on Russian Side 0.517 0.517 0.517
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1960 Share of Literates 1960 Share of Literates 1960
Prussian Side = 1 0.003 0.003 0.011
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 53 53 53
R-squared 0.735 0.787 0.862
Mean on Russian Side 0.936 0.936 0.936
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
City Dummy No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.6: Discontinuities in literacy at Prussian-Russian border
Y axis: Share of adult literates. X axis: Distance to the border in kilometers. Negative distance indicates
Russian partition. Bandwidth: 65km.
The conjecture that the benefit of high enrollment in the Prussian partition prior to 1918
might have been diminished by the fact that German was the language of instruction
is supported by the finding that the partition effect on literacy is of similar magnitude
at the Austrian-Russian border as at the Prussian-Russian border in 1921 (Table 1.8).
This suggests that the lower enrollment in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was indeed
compensated (in terms of literacy in 1921) by having already used Polish as the language of
instruction. The effect of the partition decreases more than at the Prussian-Russian border
between 1921 and 1931; however, given the very modest increase in average literacy on the
Russian side, it rather seems that literacy actually decreased in the Austrian partition. In
1960, average literacy in the counties on the former Russian side of the Austrian-Russian
border is about as high as on the former Russian side of the Prussian-Russian border.
The Austrian partition effect is still very pronounced in terms of statistical significance,
but with about 5 pp, the remaining difference seems rather small. The corresponding
graphical representation at the Austrian-Russian border is contained in Figure 1.7.
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Table 1.8: Literacy at Austrian-Russian border 1921-1960
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.242*** 0.228*** 0.170***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.042)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.836 0.886 0.908
Mean on Russian Side 0.462 0.462 0.462
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931
Austrian Side = 1 0.156*** 0.138*** 0.093***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.027)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.676 0.865 0.899
Mean on Russian Side 0.491 0.491 0.491
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1960 Share of Literates 1960 Share of Literates 1960
Austrian Side = 1 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 59 59 59
R-squared 0.574 0.740 0.769
Mean on Russian Side 0.934 0.934 0.934
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
City Dummy No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.7: Discontinuities in literacy at Austrian-Russian border
Y axis: Share of adult literates. X axis: Distance to the border in kilometers. Negative distance indicates
Russian partition. Bandwidth: 65km.
1.5.2 Robustness
I present a series of robustness checks to my previous estimates in Table 1.9. Column
1 shows again the results from estimating the two-dimensional RDD with enrollment as
the dependent variable. Column 2 shows the effect of adding partition border segment
dummies to the regression model. The border segments coincide with province borders
before and after WWI, as the latter were constructed along the former partition borders.
Along each partition border, there are two provinces on every side of each border. Neither
direction, size, nor significance of the estimates are altered by the inclusion of the border
segment dummies, with the exception of the school year 1920/21 at the Austrian-Russian
border, where the discontinuity becomes insignificant. Finally, I lower the bandwidth to 50
instead of 65 km on each side of every partition border. Doing so reduces the sample size
by about 20%. As displayed in column 3, the estimates rather increase at the Austrian-
Russian border in 1911/12 and 1920/21, while the significance disappears in 1925/26. At
the Prussian-Russian border, they remain the same as for the 65 km bandwidth in terms
of size and significance. Taken together, there is no evidence to doubt the robustness of
the initially large, but then fading partition effects at both borders.
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Table 1.9: Robustness of the two-dimensional RDD
(1) (2) (3)
Prussian-Russian Border
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Prussian Side = 1 0.832*** 0.882*** 0.825***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 54 54 42
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.378*** 0.332*** 0.355***
(0.044) (0.074) (0.054)
Observations 54 54 42
R-squared 0.902 0.906 0.912
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Prussian Side = 1 0.066* 0.037 0.056
(0.033) (0.053) (0.041)
Observations 54 54 42
R-squared 0.647 0.713 0.677
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Prussian Side = 1 0.098*** 0.086** 0.073**
(0.026) (0.037) (0.033)
Observations 54 54 42
R-squared 0.550 0.552 0.6316
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961
Prussian Side = 1 -0.031 0.029 0.011
(0.037) (0.057) (0.025)
Observations 53 53 39
R-squared 0.215 0.269 0.442
Austrian-Russian Border
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Austrian Side = 1 0.412*** 0.365*** 0.401***
(0.043) (0.077) (0.048)
Observations 44 44 37
R-squared 0.930 0.933 0.945
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.156*** 0.102 0.178***
(0.045) (0.063) (0.056)
Observations 44 44 37
R-squared 0.870 0.888 0.860
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Austrian Side = 1 0.028 0.104 0.053
(0.050) (0.083) (0.057)
Observations 44 44 37
R-squared 0.428 0.483 0.515
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Austrian Side = 1 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001
(0.027) (0.026) (0.033)
Observations 44 44 37
R-squared 0.662 0.742 0.618
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961
Austrian Side = 1 -0.002 0.013 0.019
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
Observations 59 59 47
R-squared 0.192 0.213 0.238
2nd order polynomial Yes Yes Yes
City, Geo Controls Yes Yes Yes
Border Segment Dummies No Yes No
Bandwidth (km) 65 65 50
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.6 Mechanisms
1.6.1 Changes in the population composition
I assess the potential importance of the pre-WWII population composition for the
evolution of schooling and human capital in two ways: First, I add the shares of Jews
and Protestants among a county’s population in every time period from 1911 to 1931
to Equation 1.2. Protestantism and ethnic as well as linguistic affinity to Germany
were sufficiently closely correlated in the Prussian partition in order for Protestantism
to serve as a valid proxy for both of the latter. Second, I control for the share of a
county’s population in 1921 that was not born in the same former partition that it
currently resides in. As indicated in Subsection 1.2.2.1, this share is negligible at the
Austrian-Russian border, but not at the Prussian-Russian counterpart due to the partial
emigration of the German population after WWI. Assuming that Polish immigrants
into the former Prussian partition were attracted to those areas that had previously
been abandoned by the Germans, this measure captures rather the effect of recent
population replacement, in distinction to the effect of mere declining importance of an
ethnic-religious minority picked up by the two religious shares.
In general, the population composition controls do not affect the estimated effects of
the Prussian partition sufficiently strongly to suggest that population changes represent
a driving force behind the evolution of education and human capital at the Prussian-
Russian border. Compared to the baselines reported in column 1 of Table 1.10, the
point estimate of the partition effect changes by less than 10 pp when adding the various
population shares (columns 2 and 3). Further, the tendency of the partition effect to
decline over time, with the small rebound in 1931/32, is hardly affected.
The measure of population replacement in 1921 has no effect in 1911, validating that it
indeed captures more recent population movements. The estimates presented in column
3 suggest that these movements have a strong negative effect on primary enrollment in
the years 1920/21 and 1925/26. Keeping in mind that German emigration encompassed
the emigration of a considerable number of German teaching personnel, these results
seem reasonable: In counties where population replacement took place to a relative
intensive degree, the Polish takeover of the educational infrastructure after WWI
encountered more frictions on average in the short run than elsewhere because Polish
teaching personnel had to be recruited first. However, these frictions appear to have
been overcome by the year 1931/32, as the population replacement effect is insignificant
then. In fact, controlling for all three population measures suggests that the Prussian
partition effect is not statistically different from zero anymore in 1931/32. The popula-
tion composition controls affect neither size nor significance of the estimated partition
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effects at the Austrian-Russian border (see Table 1.11), thereby confirming the presump-
tion that at least before WWII, the population has been very persistent along this border.
Table 1.10: Enrollment at Prussian-Russian border 1911-1931, population controls
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Prussian Side = 1 0.832*** 0.847*** 0.839***
(0.015) (0.027) (0.027)
Share Jewish 0.368 0.374
(0.260) (0.266)
Share Protestant 0.042* 0.022
(0.022) (0.042)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.083
(0.114)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.378*** 0.346*** 0.454***
(0.044) (0.076) (0.097)
Share Jewish -0.458 -0.429
(0.784) (0.766)
Share Protestant 0.076 0.307*
(0.157) (0.175)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.851***
(0.309)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.902 0.904 0.916
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Prussian Side = 1 0.066* 0.034 0.163***
(0.033) (0.049) (0.058)
Share Jewish -0.582 -0.492
(0.520) (0.485)
Share Protestant 0.029 0.346*
(0.257) (0.197)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.945***
(0.220)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.647 0.657 0.752
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Prussian Side = 1 0.098*** 0.092*** 0.069
(0.026) (0.030) (0.045)
Share Jewish -0.108 -0.134
(0.407) (0.429)
Share Protestant 0.029 -0.032
(0.183) (0.218)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.158
(0.191)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.550 0.550 0.555
Geo, City Controls Yes Yes Yes
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.11: Enrollment at Austrian-Russian border 1911-1931, population controls
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Austrian Side = 1 0.412*** 0.427*** 0.423***
(0.043) (0.049) (0.049)
Share Jewish 0.391 0.422
(0.374) (0.299)
Share Protestant 3.903 3.748
(2.351) (2.404)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -1.9
(1.289)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.930 0.939 0.944
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.156*** 0.123*** 0.117**
(0.045) (0.044) (0.043)
Share Jewish -1.058*** -1.291***
(0.315) (0.298)
Share Protestant -0.550 0.148
(4.774) (4.481)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 1.805*
(0.967)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.870 0.898 0.907
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Austrian Side = 1 0.028 0.031 0.033
(0.050) (0.054) (0.055)
Share Jewish -0.177 0.036
(0.688) (0.707)
Share Protestant -2.593 -2.720
(4.976) (5.215)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -1.390
(1.793)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.428 0.434 0.445
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Austrian Side = 1 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Share Jewish 0.094 0.061
(0.264) (0.277)
Share Protestant -1.525 -1.592
(3.007) (3.028)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.230
(0.459)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.662 0.668 0.670
Geo, City Controls Yes Yes Yes
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
With regard to literacy, the importance of the population composition appears to be even
lower. The partition effect only rises somewhat considerably at the Prussian-Russian
border in 1931 when controlling for the share of the population born outside of the re-
spective residential partition (column 3 of Table 1.12), indicating a depressing effect of
the recent population replacement on human capital, possibly via the former’s (short-
run) negative effect on enrollment previously detected. Again, the partition effect at the
Austrian-Russian border is predominantly unaffected (Table 1.13).
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Table 1.12: Literacy at Prussian-Russian Border 1921-1931, population controls
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.244*** 0.263*** 0.280***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.024)
Share Jewish 0.401 0.406
(0.251) (0.252)
Share Protestant 0.070 0.107
(0.059) (0.066)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.135
(0.131)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.967 0.969 0.970
Mean on Russian Side 0.509 0.509 0.509
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931
Prussian Side = 1 0.192*** 0.213*** 0.245***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017)
Share Jewish 0.433*** 0.468***
(0.157) (0.165)
Share Protestant 0.035 0.119*
(0.107) (0.070)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.218***
(0.067)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.976 0.979 0.982
Mean on Russian Side 0.517 0.517 0.517
Geo, City Controls Yes Yes Yes
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.13: Literacy at Austrian-Russian border 1921-1931, population controls
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.171***
(0.042) (0.046) (0.048)
Share Jewish 0.298 0.332
(0.259) (0.245)
Share Protestant 2.403* 2.301*
(1.291) (1.303)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.264
(0.787)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.908 0.915 0.915
Mean on Russian Side 0.462 0.462 0.462
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931
Austrian Side = 1 0.093*** 0.103*** 0.103***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.032)
Share Jewish 0.366 0.427*
(0.228) (0.250)
Share Protestant -1.244 -1.119
(1.749) (1.561)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.430
(0.506)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.899 0.908 0.911
Mean on Russian Side 0.491 0.491 0.491
Geo, City Controls Yes Yes Yes
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.6.2 Supply and endowment of schools
Given the observed fading discontinuities in primary school enrollment at both borders,
it is natural to ask how far this process was accompanied or had even been preceded by
an alignment of the network of schools across the former partitions. Therefore, I calculate
the number of primary schools per 1000 inhabitants of primary school age for each county
from 1911 to 1960/61 in order to test for discontinuities in this proxy for school supply and
density.5 In order to adjust for the fact that the schools in the Russian partition were very
ill-equipped compared to the ones in the Austrian and Prussian partitions respectively, I
also calculate the number of classes in primary schools per 1000 inhabitants of primary
school age. ‘Classes’ proxy for school quality in this context because they denote how
many different grades of a school are taught within the same classroom. Finally, I also
compute the number of primary school teachers per 1000 school-aged inhabitants as an
additional measure of school endowment. A drawback is that data on the number of
classes and teachers are not available for the school years 1931/32 and 1960/61.
Unsurprisingly, the results displayed in Panel A of Table 1.14 suggest that the network of
5I use the number of inhabitants of primary school age because the number of primary school students
is endogenous to the supply of primary schools.
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primary schools in the Prussian partition was both denser and of better quality compared
to the Russian partition in 1911/12: The average number of primary schools per 1000
school-age children jumps by more than five at the Prussian side of the border or by
about 250%. The discontinuities in the provision of classes and teachers is of even greater
magnitude; it amounts to about 700% and 450% respectively, underscoring the woeful
state of primary education in the Russian partition at that time.
During the early years of the Second Republic, the estimates of the partition effect decrease
considerably in magnitude, as the average numbers of primary schools and classes triple
in the former Russian partition, with the number of teachers growing at an even higher
rate. However, the estimates neither turn statistically insignificant nor quantitatively
negligible, with only minor changes in 1925/26. Still, the supply of teachers and classes
increases steadily in the former Russian partition, indicating a convergence of these two
quality measures to a relatively high level of standard. The difference with regard to
the density of schools remains sizable in 1931/32, as it actually shows a slight rebound
compared to the previous post-WWI periods. Only in 1960/61, with the former Russian
side of the Prussian-Russian partition border providing on average seven primary schools
per 1000 children at school-age, the point estimate of the former Prussian partition turns
negative and weakly significant.
Interestingly, there is no discontinuity in school density at the Austrian-Russian border
in 1911/12. The results presented in Panel B of Table 1.14 are rather inconclusive with
regard to this measure across time, indicating a small advantage on the territory of the
former Austrian partition only in 1931/32. Nevertheless, in 1960/61, the effect is small,
negative and weakly statistically significant, similar to the Prussian partition effect in the
same time period.
Still, the Austrian side of the border exhibits a positive difference in school quality as
measured by the number of classes and teachers in 1911/12. Thus, the advantage of the
Austrian partition over the Russian partition appears to run through the quality and not
the number of schools close to the end of the imperial rule. This advantage, however, is
much smaller than that of the Prussian partition. It declines over time, with the effect
on teacher supply being insignificant in 1931/32, while the estimated coefficient is still
positive and sizable. But whether or not the disappearance of statistical significance is due
to imprecise estimates, the supply of both classes and teachers increases on either side of
the Austrian-Russian border to a similar level as along the Prussian-Russian counterpart.
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Table 1.14: Schools, classes, teachers at partition borders 1911-1961
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Prussian-Russian Border
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1911 Classes Per 1000 School-Aged 1911 Teachers Per 1000 School-Aged 1911
Prussian Side = 1 5.408*** 16.559*** 11.305***
(0.535) (0.591) (0.642)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.936 0.981 0.977
Mean on Russian Side 2.143 2.262 2.413
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1921 Classes Per 1000 School-Aged 1921 Teachers Per 1000 School-Aged 1921
Prussian Side = 1 1.684** 7.894*** 3.463***
(0.632) (0.891) (0.741)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.740 0.810 0.603
Mean on Russian Side 6.659 7.915 9.377
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1926 Classes Per 1000 School-Aged 1926 Teachers Per 1000 School-Aged 1926
Prussian Side = 1 1.820*** 7.332*** 4.781***
(0.450) (1.164) (0.976)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.876 0.714 0.590
Mean on Russian Side 6.645 13.727 13.177
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1932




Mean on Russian Side 6.042
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1961




Mean on Russian Side 7.024
Panel B: Austrian-Russian Border
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1911 Classes Per 1000 School-Aged 1911 Teachers Per 1000 School-Aged 1911
Austrian Side = 1 -0.089 4.998*** 4.500***
(0.574) (0.959) (0.948)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.448 0.879 0.884
Mean on Russian Side 2.47 2.648 3.144
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1921 Classes Per 1000 School-Aged 1921 Teachers Per 1000 School-Aged 1921
Austrian Side = 1 -2.338** 0.852 2.196**
(0.865) (0.863) (0.994)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.580 0.609 0.838
Mean on Russian Side 5.71 8.154 9.01
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1926 Classes Per 1000 School-Aged 1926 Teachers Per 1000 School-Aged 1926
Austrian Side = 1 -0.550 3.152** 2.020
(0.563) (1.499) (1.464)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.560 0.675 0.644
Mean on Russian Side 5.234 12.435 12.392
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1932




Mean on Russian Side 4.751
Dep. Variable Schools Per 1000 School-Aged 1961




Mean on Russian Side 6.024
City, Geo Controls Yes Yes Yes
2nd Order Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Two-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
45
1.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the importance of history in the aftermath of a large-scale natural
experiment that had split the Polish nation into three partitions under different impe-
rial rule. Beginning in the last years of existence of the three empires, I find that the
educational differences among the partition populations that the empires had instilled
during their century-long control over Poland were tremendous: The Prussian partition
surpassed the Russian one in terms of primary enrollment by more than 80 pp, reflecting
both the high standard and enforcement of public education in Prussia. The differences in
enrollment between the Austrian and the Russian partition, in turn, were less dramatic,
but still amounted to more than 40 pp. However, my results further show that these gaps
have essentially been eliminated by 1931 or less than 15 years since the reconstitution of
the Polish state after WWI. They do not reappear after the chaos of WWII, but instead
remain nonexistent during the communist period of Polish history. The achievement of
universal literacy took longer to reach due to simple demographic reasons, but it was
essentially completed as well in 1960. It is reasonable to conclude therefore that the non-
persistence of imperial legacies in education observed by Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015)
in present-day Poland was accomplished relatively soon after the Poles had been fully
handed back the control over their educational system.
I further provide evidence that population changes in the partitions, in particular the em-
igration of the German minority from the former Prussian partition in interwar Poland,
had at best short-run negative effects on education. The equalization of enrollment, in
turn, was accompanied by an expansion of both the network of primary schools and the
quality of schools as proxied by classes and teachers. Thus, the public supply of educa-
tional facilities was successfully directed at the previously disadvantaged former Russian
partition in central Poland.
There are still numerous open questions in the context of the history of the partitions and
education in Poland. I show that within a relatively short episode of this history, the im-
perial legacies on the extensive margin of primary education fade out. However, it could
well be the case that legacies continue to exist not only on the intensive margin of quality
(Bukowski, 2016), but also on higher levels of educational attainment. Further, I cannot
provide direct evidence on the importance of educational institutions and culture in the
time frame of my sample due to the lack of disaggregated institutional data and, even
more, the lack of survey information that allows eliciting the role of social norms and cul-
ture as utilized by Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya (2015) and Bukowski (2016) in contemporary
Poland. However, if there were imperial legacies in educational institutions and culture,
then they did not restrain (or advance) one partition over another permanently, at least
in terms of basic human capital. Another interesting question concerns the importance
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of spillovers after the dissolution of the imperial borders. For example, it is conceivable
that the counties in the former Russian partition that were located close to the former
Austrian border were able to adopt elements of the already advanced system of school
organization from the former Austrian partition after 1918. Answering this question is
currently beyond the depth of my data.
In total, the case of human capital formation in the aftermath of the Partitions of Poland
suggests that substantial differences in education that were laid down over the course of
a century can be leveled within a modern state in a comparatively short period of time.
The finding that Poland did indeed accomplish this is, of course, to be interpreted within
the historical context of my sample period: After its regained independence after WWI,
Poland was competing with European nations, in particular Germany, that were already
much more advanced in terms of universal education. The situation might have been
somewhat comparable to that of Prussia and its competition with England and France
one hundred years earlier that stimulated large-scale and swift reforms of the Prussian
education system. Noteworthy, my finding of rapid integration in educational terms cor-
responds to the assessment of Trenkler & Wolf (2005) that by the middle of the 1920s,
Poland’s internal markets were already well-integrated, too.
Finally, the richness of the school data that is not nearly fully exploited by this study calls
for further research with regard to the potential (non-)disappearance of other educational




Competitive Voting in Ghana
2.1 Introduction
Ethnic favoritism has become an intensely studied phenomenon in the economic analysis
of both governance in general and democracy in particular. Needless to say, investigations
into ethnic favoritism have been largely directed at countries and continents where ethnic
identities are considered to be strong and relevant. For example, Burgess et al. (2015)
show that ethnic favoritism, as measured in terms of road investments in Kenyan districts
that are co-ethnic with the respective political ruler, has been widespread under various
autocratic rulers of different ethnic affiliation, while it appears to have been curbed after
Kenya’s transition to democracy in the early 1990s. Kramon & Posner (2016), in turn,
assess that with regard to education, ethnic favoritism in Kenya has all but disappeared
under democracy. In the broader context of sub-Saharan Africa, Franck & Rainer (2012)
estimate large and widespread ethnic gains in terms of education and health originating
from time periods when an ethnic group has been co-ethnic with its respective country’s
leader. On average, these gains remain unaffected by whether the form of government
is democratic or autocratic. De Luca et al. (2016) document widespread favoritism in
terms of nighttime lights on the level of ethnic homelands. Using a global dataset, they
suggest that ethnic favoritism is common across, but not limited to sub-Saharan Africa,
with rather negligible dampening effects of the quality of political institutions.
Under which circumstances could ethnic favoritism actually occur in a democratic system
of governance? As pointed out by Amodio & Chiovelli (2016), democracy can broaden
the scope for strategic interactions between politicians and ethnic leaders. The mixed
evidence on the prevalence of ethnic favoritism under democracy suggests that the out-
comes of these interactions might be heterogeneous with regard to the extent of ethnic
favoritism that they are able to provide (or prevent). From the perspective of economic
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theories of democracy, the empirical prevalence of ethnic favoritism under democracy can
be related to the ‘core’ voter concept of Cox & McCubbins (1986): Political parties differ
with regard to their ability to redistribute towards different groups among the electorate,
while the groups in turn differ strongly in terms of their ideological party preference. In
equilibrium, this results in each party focussing its redistributive efforts on the specific
group(s) to which it can redistribute the easiest. Hence, groups are generally not courted
by more than one party, making them solid, delimited political blocks which enjoy high
patronage as soon as ‘their’ party climbs to power.
At first sight, the case of the West African country of Ghana bears a large similarity to
other nations whose democratization has been the subject of previous studies: Ghana
returned to constitutional democracy in 1992 in the course of the so-called third wave of
democratization (Huntington, 1991) after decades of alternating democratic turmoil and
military rule. The latter culminated in the eleven-year reign of Jerry John Rawlings as the
Chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council. Similar to the Kenyan experience,
Rawlings then formed a political party, the New Democratic Congress (NDC), and went
on to become the first democratically elected president of the Ghanaian fourth republic.
All quadrennial elections since 1992 have been considered free and fair; they have also
resulted in the first peaceful transition of power from the NDC to its main challenger,
the New Patriotic Party (NPP), in the year 2000 when the constitution barred Rawlings
from running for a third presidential term. From the viewpoint of ethnicity, Ghana’s
ethnic landscape is as much a product of the arbitrariness of colonial borders as many
other African nations. The Asante, who have once been the rulers of the powerful Ashanti
empire, exhibit a strong and long-lived ethnic affiliation to the NPP. The NDC, in turn,
has strong ties to the Ewe ethnic group, given that Jerry John Rawlings belongs to this
group as well.
However, it is questionable whether Ghana’s ethnic setup features the necessary precon-
ditions for large-scale redistribution towards the respective president’s co-ethnics because
none of the two politically invested groups is actually large enough to secure a majority
of the national vote by its own. This suggests that the two political parties rather have to
compete for the votes of the more unaffiliated Ghanaian electorate outside of the parties’
ethnic boundaries. This political constellation bears more similarity to the probabilistic
or ‘swing’ voting models pioneered by Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan
(1996). The essential prediction of these models is that those groups that contain the
highest share of non-partisan, ‘moderate’ voters will be promised the highest share of
redistributive transfers by the political parties because the moderates are the most likely
to ‘swing’ their votes from one party to the other in return for economic remuneration.
Correspondingly, survey evidence in Lindberg & Morrison (2005) and Lindberg (2012)
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indicates a relatively high and growing share of swing voters among the Ghanaian elec-
torate. Evidence by Banful (2011) on the political economy of local budget allocations
by the Ghanaian central government further suggests that districts which exhibit tighter
vote margins in a presidential election receive higher allocations afterwards. Banful (2011)
does not explore any ethnic dimensions of these voting patterns though.
This paper attempts to broaden the scope for the understanding of ethnic favoritism. It
does so by exploiting electoral results and changes of government in Ghana between 1992
and 2008. I first show that the two Ghanaian ethnicities that are co-ethnic with the vary-
ing presidents become economically worse off in relative terms soon after the country’s
return to democracy. I then test the prediction of the probabilistic voting theory that
close voting should be associated with economic transfers if there are moderate groups
of voters to be swayed. I find that there is indeed a positive association between close
voting and economic prosperity, thereby confirming the finding of Banful (2011). How-
ever, I further show that this association runs entirely through the homeland of the large,
politically unaffiliated ethnic group of the Akan, while it is not detectable with regard to
other ethnicities. Taken together, these results suggest that while the eagerness of polit-
ical parties to form multi-ethnic electoral coalitions has the effect of constraining ethnic
favoritism towards the co-ethnics of the respective political leader, the same eagerness
can give rise to ethnic favoritism directed towards groups that signal their readiness to
be courted by the political contestants.
The paper hence contributes to the aforementioned literature on ethnic favoritism in
democracies. It further makes a methodological contribution to the literature: Because
there are no official statistics on economic prosperity at the district level, which is the
level of observation in the following, I make use of nighttime lights as a proxy variable.
While nighttime lights have already been extensively utilized in the context of ethnic fa-
voritism, I reaffirm the usefulness of nighttime lights for detecting patterns of favoritism
at the sub-national level.
I present an abridgment of the probabilistic voting theory, as well as more background in-
formation on Ghana’s system of governance, ethnic divisions, and elections in Section 2.2.
Section 2.3 presents the data for the intended analysis, followed by the empirical strategy
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 first provides the results on the negative effects of co-ethnicity
on economic prosperity and then moves on to point out the positive relationship between
the economic prosperity of the Akan-dominated districts and their close-voting behavior.
The subsequent Section 2.6 provides a discussion of the results. Section 2.7 concludes
with a prospect for further research on democracy in Ghana.
50
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Probabilistic voting theory
The two seminal theoretical contributions to the understanding of intense political compe-
tition for similar groups of voters are Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan
(1996). The formulation of the latter is more general in the sense that it also features
an outcome in which each party targets its loyal electoral core instead of the unaffiliated
voters are the prime recipients of redistribution. However, as this outcome is not partic-
ularly relevant for the Ghanaian case, I omit it.
The models’ setups are very similar to each other: Following the notation of Lindbeck
& Weibull (1987), two political parties, A and B, compete for the electorate I consist-
ing of n voters indexed by i. Voters receive an exogenous and fixed gross income of
ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) > 0. The electorate is further divided into m disjoint and distinguishable
groups, where the kth group Ik contains nk voters (with ∑nk = n). Each member of
group k receives a transfer zk, whereas the sum of transfers across all groups must satisfy
the balanced-budget constraint ∑nkzk = 0. xk(i) then denotes a feasible balanced-budget
redistribution that individual i receives as a member of group k. Voters are rational
and derive utility ui from two (additively-separable) components: vi(ωi + xk(i)), which
exhibits strictly positive, but strictly decreasing marginal returns to consumption, and
their ideological preferences ai and bi for other policies enacted by party A respectively
B. Party A can convince a voter with a stronger ideological preference for party B to
vote nevertheless for party A by offering her such a generous transfer that her utility from
consuming the transfer exceeds the utility from voting in accordance with her political
beliefs for party B. However, parties cannot observe individual ideological preferences,
which is why they assign probability distributions Fi over them (hence the term ‘proba-
bilistic voting’) with the corresponding density functions fi. Under the assumption that
fi is unimodal and symmetric, a single scalar αi then denotes the expected party bias of
an individual for party A over party B. In equilibrium, both parties will follow symmetric
strategies and favor those groups in the electorate with a relatively high share of mod-
erate individuals with weak partisan biases. Supposing further that all individuals have
the same consumption preferences and party preference distributions differ only between,
but not within groups, the per-capita transfer to a group is then a decreasing function of
the absolute value of the expected party bias in the group:
∑ v′(ci)/nk = λ/f(αi) (2.1)
51
where i ∈ Ik and λ is the Lagrangian multiplier from the vote maximization problem of
the political parties. The density function on the right-hand side is decreasing in the
absolute expected party bias, while the marginal utility of consumption on the left-hand
side is decreasing in the level of consumption. Hence, in equilibrium, lower values of
the expected party bias translate into higher transfers and the votes of the groups with
the lowest expected partisan biases are the most contested, resulting in them swinging
between the two parties.
Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan (1996) further point to a number
of special cases: If the party preference distributions are the same for all individuals,
then the political equilibrium is identical to the outcome of maximizing the utilitarian so-
cial welfare function subject to the balanced-budget constraint. Moreover, if there are no
party biases in the population, then the expected vote share for each party is exactly 50%.
The assumption of rational voters further implies that all promises of balanced-budget
redistribution are credible and that voters will not be systematically fooled by political
parties promising them positive redistribution, but then not enacting it accordingly.
A straight-forward prediction of the probabilistic voter models is that groups which com-
prise a high share of politically unaffiliated swing voters should on average receive positive
transfers in the aftermath of an election. Because I observe neither voters nor their po-
litical affiliations directly, I assume that the observed ex post electoral competitiveness
of a district, calculated as the absolute vote margin between the two relevant parties,
reflects the underlying distribution of partisan bias. This translates into estimating a
reduced-form relationship between a measure of economic transfers and the vote margin
at the district level.
2.2.2 Democratic institutions and elections in Ghana
After eleven years of authoritarian rule under the leadership of Flight Lieutenant Jerry
John Rawlings, which had already been preceded by a series of military coups d’état,
Ghana returned to democracy as the country’s system of government with the adoption
of a new constitution by referendum in April 1992. Since then, the candidate who wins
the majority of the national vote in a presidential election becomes the next president.
Rawlings emerged as the winner of the first presidential election held later in 1992 on
the ticket of the newly-formed National Democratic Congress (NDC). In accordance with
the constitutional provisions, elections have since then been held every four years, with
Rawlings winning a second term in 1996. However, because the constitution limits the
number of presidential terms to two, Rawlings could not run again in 2000. His designated
successor John Atta Mills was defeated by the candidate of the then-oppositional New
Patriotic Party (NPP), John Kufuor, marking the first democratic transfer of power under
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the 1992 constitution. Kufuor went on to win a second term in 2004, while his designated
successor Nana Akufo-Addo in turn lost to Atta Mills in the very tightly contested 2008
election, thereby returning power to the NDC. However, Atta Mills unexpectedly died in
office shortly before the completion of his first term. After the smooth transfer of power
to the by-then vice president John Mahama, the latter went on to win the 2012 election,
only to be defeated by Akufo-Addo and the NPP in the latest election in 2016.
Since 1996, parliamentary elections have been held on the same date as the presidential
ones. While split-ticket voting with regard to presidential and parliamentary candidates,
or ‘skirt-and-blouse’ voting, as it is commonly called in Ghana, is possible, so far every
victorious presidential candidate’s party has also won the majority of the parliamentary
seats. In addition, the parliament’s position is generally considered weak in comparison to
the office of the president. For example, allocations of public funds are largely controlled
by the president respectively his appointees (Banful, 2011), which is why I follow the
literature and focus exclusively on the presidential elections in the following.
Between 1992 and 2000, voting took place in 200 electoral constituencies, while this
number was increased to 230 in 2004 and further to 275 in 2012. Every constituency
is comprised within the boundaries of a district assembly. One district assembly may
comprise several constituencies, but not vice versa. District assemblies (hereafter referred
to as districts) constitute the lowest level of administrative divisions in Ghana, with
ten regions being located between the national and the district level. While the regions
are relatively unimportant as institutions of governance, the districts are recipients of
relevant funds from the central government (Banful, 2011). In parallel with the state of
constituencies, the district count was kept constant at 110 between 1992 and 2000. By
2004, it has been raised to 138 by splitting a number of districts in two, allowing it to
restore the original 110 boundaries. However, between 2004 and 2008, the district count
was further increased to 170 not only by splitting, but also by redrawing a number of
districts, making it impossible to aggregate them back to their former shape. Another
46 districts have been added since 2012, raising the current count to 216. Due to these
administrative changes, I focus the analysis on the elections 1992-2004 in the following.
Outlines of the ten regions and 110 districts provided by IPUMS International (2017) are
displayed in Figure 2.1.
In general, with the exception of 1992, the two parties NDC and NPP together have
always acquired more than 90% of the national vote. If neither party wins more than 50%
of the national vote in the first round of an election, which is possible due to a handful
of small parties competing with the two larger ones in the first round, a second or runoff
round is held. Within the sample period, this happened only in 2000, with the NPP
expanding its lead on the NDC from the first to the second round.
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Figure 2.1: Administrative divisions of Ghana
(a) 10 Regions (b) 110 Districts
2.2.3 Ethnic politics in Ghana
Both NDC and NPP exhibit strong ethnic ties to different ethnic groups in Ghana. While
Rawlings’ father was British, his mother belonged to the Ewe people mainly located in
Ghana’s Volta region along the border to Togo. Due to Rawlings’ role as the founding
father and long-term chairperson of the NDC, the party usually obtains very high vote
shares in the Ewe-dominated territories. Conversely, the NPP is strongly associated with
the Asante people, whose homeland is the Ashanti region. This association even predates
the 1990s, with the Asante already supporting predecessors of the NPP which stood in op-
position to Ghana’s first democratically elected, but increasingly authoritarian president
Kwame Nkrumah in the 1960s (Ichino & Nathan, 2013). In terms of their origin and lan-
guage, the Asante are a subgroup of the Akan people who form the largest (45% including
the Asante) ethnic group within Ghana.1 According to national population accounts, the
Asante themselves represent about 15% of the population, while the Ewe represent about
12%. Thus, the two groups are almost equally strong in terms of members, but each of
them is far from being able to achieve a majority of the national vote on its own.
The Akan homelands are predominantly located in the regions surrounding Ashanti,
namely Brong-Ahafo to the north, the Western region to the south-west, and the Eastern
region to the south-east. The Central region to the south of Ashanti comprises the home-
land of the Fante, the largest identifiable Akan group after the Asante. The remaining
ethnic groups of Ghana, who comprise about 45% of the population, are neither closely
related to the Asante, nor to the Akan in general, nor to the Ewe. The coastal homeland
of the Ga-Adangbe people (7% of the population) contains Ghana’s capital Accra and
is therefore densely populated, as well as increasing ethnically mixed due to the steady
1‘Akan’ in the following refers to the Akan groups other than the Asante.
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influx of internal migrants from other parts of the country. The ethnic groups that inhabit
the north of Ghana, most notably the Mole-Dagbani (15% of the population) and various
spatially more concentrated groups like the Guan (4%), the Gurma (3%) and the Grusi
(2%) are particularly distinct from the other ethnicities with regard to their indigenous
language and their religion, which is predominantly Islam. Districts where the population
share of the respective ethnic group exceeds 50% are displayed in Figure B.1.
2.2.4 Competitiveness of Ghanaian elections
There are strong indications that elections in Ghana have become much more competitive
in terms of vote margins since the return to democracy in 1992. This tendency can be
observed both at the national and at the district level: The national vote margin steadily
declines from 28.1 pp in 1992 over 17.7 pp in 1996 to 13.8 pp in 2000 and further to
7.81 pp in 2004. The district-level margins of winning, as displayed in the histograms
of Figure 2.2, visibly tightens in particular from 1992 to 2000. Complementary, in
Figure 2.3, the district-level vote margins of two consecutive elections are plotted against
each other. Observations below the 45○ line indicate districts which become more
competitive from one election to the next one. While some districts also become less
competitive over time, plotting the vote margins of the 2004 against those of the 1992
elections illustrates that the majority of the district-level observations moves towards
tighter electoral outcomes.
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Figure 2.2: Histograms of vote margins in presidential elections 1992-2004
(a) 1992 (b) 1996
(c) 2000 (d) 2004
Figure 2.3: Margins of victory in presidential elections 1992-2004
(a) 1992 vs. 1996 (b) 1996 vs. 2000
(c) 2000 vs. 2004 (d) 1992 vs. 2004
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These descriptives are consistent with representative survey evidence by Lindberg & Mor-
rison (2005): In 2003, 18% of the Ghanaian respondents fall into the category of swing
voters. This classification is based on whether respondents stated that they had voted
consistently for one party in the 2000 and 1996 elections or whether they had switched
between parties.
Figure 2.4 displays the evolution of the spatial distribution of competitive districts across
the elections from 1992 to 2004. The five different degrees of coloring reflect five different
bins of vote margins: up to 5, 5-10, 10-20, 20-50, and 50- percentage points, with the
color intensity increasing with the shrinking vote margin. The maps suggest that highly
competitive districts are a rare phenomenon in the early years of the reconstituted Ghana-
ian democracy. By the time of the 2000 elections, however, they are well-established in
the Akan-dominated Central, Western, and Brong-Ahafo regions surrounding the Ashanti
region, as well as in the small, but densely populated Greater Accra region. The Ashanti
and Volta regions, i.e. the ethnic homelands of the Asante respectively Ewe people, are
unsurprisingly not closely contested in any election.
Figure 2.4: Spatial distribution of vote margins in presidential elections 1992-2004
(a) 1992 (b) 1996
(c) 2000 (d) 2004
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2.3 Data
Information on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups at the district level is obtained
from the 10% extract of the Ghanaian Population and Housing Census of the year 2000
provided by IPUMS International (2017). While the census lists a total of 55 ethnic
identities, it also subsumes the latter under eight aggregate labels. Given that more than
half of the more disaggregated group classifications each represent less than 1% of the
Ghanaian population, the aggregate labels are used in the following.2
Electoral data on the constituency level for most elections are provided by the Electoral
Commission of Ghana, while some results are supplemented from online news repositories.
Because the boundaries of constituencies are always fully comprised within the district
boundaries, the votes of multiple constituencies within the same district can be summed
up in order to compute the respective vote shares at the district level. The 200 electoral
constituencies of the period 1992-2000 and the 230 constituencies in 2004 are matched into
the 110 original districts, resulting in a balanced panel dataset spanning all elections from
1992 to 2004. While this procedure ignores the aforementioned split-up of some districts
between the years 2000 and 2004, Banful (2011) provides evidence that the probability
whether a district was split up is unrelated to its past electoral performance.
Due to the absence of repeated district-level data on poverty, GDP and the like, a dis-
trict’s economic prosperity is proxied with its intensity of nighttime lights. The stable
lights composite of the Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series provided by
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)3 allows the yearly com-
putation of the logarithm of the nighttime lights per pixel at the district level from 1993
to 2008. This timing is due to the fact that Ghanaian elections always take place in the
month of December of an election year, resulting in the new government assuming office
not before the beginning of the following year. A presidential term is thus considered as
the four years following an election year. Following standard practice, the constant 0.01
is added to every district-level observation before taking logs in order to avoid completely
unlit districts dropping out of the sample. The ability of nighttime lights to measure
economic activity is established by Henderson et al. (2012) at the national level, while
Hodler & Raschky (2014) and Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013) extend their scope
to the subnational level.
Summary statistics for the relevant variables are shown in Table B.1 in the appendix to
this chapter.
2The Guan do not represent the majority of the population in any district, which is why this group is
neglected in the following analysis.
3Image and data processing by the Earth Observation Group, NOAA National Geophysical Data
Center. DMSP data collected by US Air Force Weather Agency.
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2.4 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy of this study is composed of two elements. The first one exploits
variation in the co-ethnicity status of the two groups that each are co-ethnic with the
president and the ruling party at some point during the sample period. This variation
is induced in districts where either the Ewe or the Asante represent the majority of
the population by the change in government from the NDC to the NPP following the
election in the year 2000. The corresponding two-way fixed effects regression model closely
resembles the econometric approach of Burgess et al. (2015) and De Luca et al. (2016):
yit = α ⋅Co-Ethnicit + β ⋅Co-Ethnicit ⋅ Termt + γ ⋅ Termt + δt + µi + it (2.2)
where the dependent variable are (log) nighttime lights in district i in year t and
Co-Ethnicit is a binary indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if a district’s ma-
jority population is co-ethnic with the Ghanaian president during the respective time
period and zero otherwise. A positive and statistically significant estimate of the coef-
ficient α would be interpreted as evidence for ethnic favoritism. The marginal effect of
co-ethnicity with the president can further be allowed to vary across presidential terms
by interacting the co-ethnicity indicator with Termt dummies for three of the four terms.
In line with the aforementioned timing of Ghanaian elections, the electoral victory of the
NPP in 2000 alters the co-ethnicity status for the Asante- and Ewe-dominated districts
only in 2001. Similarly, each of the presidential term dummies is switched to 1 only during
the four years following the respective election year.
δt and µi represent year and district fixed effects respectively. While the former ab-
sorb country-wide economic shocks, as well as year-dependent measurement errors in
the nighttime lights outcome variable, the latter control for time-invariant heterogeneity
across districts. Errors are allowed to be clustered within districts over time.
Instead of incorporating the co-ethnicity indicator, it is also possible to directly consider
the potential economic fortunes that accrue to districts where the Ewe or the Asante
represent the majority of the population. Given that the binary indicator variables that
reflect the presence of these population majorities are time-invariant, however, only their
interaction effects with the presidential terms can be identified in the fixed-effects model.
The second element of the empirical strategy models variation in the districts’ nighttime
lights intensity as a result of the district-level interplay between close voting and the
ethnic composition. While any indicators of ethnic composition are time-invariant within
districts, the voting behavior varies across elections. Interacting the two hence allows
identifying the marginal effects of ethnicity on the effect of close voting while maintaining
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the two-way fixed effects framework:
yit = α ⋅Competitivenessit + β ⋅Competitivenessit ⋅Ethnicij + δt + µi + it (2.3)
where Competitivenessit is a measure of the electoral competitiveness of the districts
that varies with the quadrennial elections. This study considers two such measures: the
vote margin as an absolute measure of electoral tightness and the decile rank of the vote
margin as a relative one. The vote margin is computed as the absolute difference between
the vote shares of the NDC and the NPP, which are the only relevant parties. Hence, the
vote margin changes within each district after every election, i.e. every four years. The
vote margin is also the measure of choice in Banful (2011). Given that the latter reports
a strong negative association between the vote margin and budget allocations of the
central government to district authorities between 1994 and 2005, estimating Equation 2.3
without the interaction term can serve as a test of the ability of the nighttime lights proxy
to pick up the effect of the politically induced spending. However, the vote margin is
not necessarily comparable across all four elections in the sample. In order to take this
potential pitfall into account, the vote margin of each district is assigned to its decile rank
for each election separately.
The binary variable Ethnicij then indicates whether ethnic group j represents the majority
of the population in district i.
A district’s urbanization rate and the average years of schooling of a district’s population
in the year 2000 are interacted with linear time trends. The interactions can be added
to all aforementioned regression models to control for trends in these two variables that
might affect a district’s economic prosperity.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Co-ethnicity and economic prosperity
Column 1 of Table 2.1 reports the result from estimating Equation 2.2 while omitting
the interaction between the co-ethnicity indicator and the presidential terms, hence iden-
tifying only from the within-district variation in the co-ethnicity status. The estimate
of the parameter α suggests that the effect of co-ethnicity with the Ghanaian president
on nighttime lights is negative when averaging it over the entire sample period, but the
estimate is statistically insignificant. This result is unaffected by controlling for district
trends in urbanization and schooling (columns 2 and 3).
Column 1 of Table 2.2 shows results from repeating the estimation of Equation 2.2, but
now allowing the effect of co-ethnicity to vary across the presidential terms. While omit-
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Table 2.1: Co-ethnicity and economic prosperity 1992-2008
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Log Nighttime Lights
Co-Ethnic -0.057 -0.049 -0.056
(0.064) (0.062) (0.054)
Observations 1,760 1,760 1,760
Within R2 0.285 0.316 0.321
Number of clusters 110 110 110
District & Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Urbanization rate 2000 x Trend No Yes Yes
Years of schooling 2000 x Trend No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ting the interaction with the first presidential term (1993-1996), the parameter estimates
for the three remaining terms reveal that the effect of co-ethnicity depends considerably
on the government in power. The main effect of co-ethnicity is positive and significant,
suggesting that co-ethnic districts exhibit on average a 34% (exp(0.291) − 1 = 0.3378)
higher nighttime lights intensity than districts that are not co-ethnic. However, the effect
of co-ethnicity is considerably smaller in magnitude during the second presidential term
(exp(0.291 − 0.218) − 1 = 0.073 = 7.3%). Then, after the NPP take-over of power at the
beginning of the third presidential term and Asante-majority districts becoming co-ethnic
with the president, the total effect of co-ethnicity is even negative and large in absolute
size: Nighttime lights intensity is 21% lower (exp(0.291−0.526)−1) for co-ethnic districts.
This relative disadvantage continues on a similar level during the second term of the NPP-
led government from 2005 to 2008, which simultaneously represents the last presidential
term in the sample. Taken together, these results suggest that ethnic favoritism appears
to be weak in the Ghanaian context given that the association between co-ethnicity and
economic prosperity becomes minuscule quickly after Ghana’s return to democracy and
then even turns negative after the country’s first democratic transition of power.
Considering the changing fortunes of the Ewe and the Asante separately over the presi-
dential terms reveals another interesting pattern: Column 1 of Table 2.3 shows that, as
expected from the previous results, districts with a majority of Ewe among their popula-
tion are relatively worse off during the second presidential term when the NDC is still in
power. Notably, they continue to be worse off compared to the remainder of districts also
when they are not co-ethnic with the president anymore: While the estimated interaction
effect during the first NPP term is insignificant, it is negative, highly significant and large
in absolute magnitude (exp(−0.378)−1 = 31% lower nighttime lights intensity) during the
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Table 2.2: Co-ethnicity and economic prosperity by governments 1992-2008
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Log Nighttime Lights
Co-Ethnic 0.291** 0.322*** 0.260**
(0.113) (0.110) (0.128)
Co-Ethnic x (1997-2000) -0.218** -0.230*** -0.207**
(0.090) (0.086) (0.092)
Co-Ethnic x (2001-2004) -0.526*** -0.561*** -0.476**
(0.170) (0.158) (0.186)
Co-Ethnic x (2005-2008) -0.538*** -0.573*** -0.476**
(0.193) (0.191) (0.224)
1997-2000 0.754*** 0.960*** 1.042***
(0.093) (0.108) (0.117)
2001-2004 0.786*** 1.111*** 1.235***
(0.094) (0.123) (0.155)
2005-2008 1.117*** 1.559*** 1.731***
(0.095) (0.142) (0.195)
Observations 1,760 1,760 1,760
Within R2 0.292 0.324 0.326
Number of clusters 110 110 110
District & Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Urbanization rate 2000 x Trend No Yes Yes
Years of schooling 2000 x Trend No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
second NPP term. This result holds when controlling for the urbanization and schooling
trends (column 2) and when using the population share of the Ewe instead of the majority
indicator (columns 3 and 4).
Conversely, districts where the majority of the population belongs to the Asante ethnicity
are already worse off in the last presidential period before the NPP climbs to power, as
reported in column 5. The magnitude of their disadvantage increases just slightly during
the two subsequent terms when the Asante are co-ethnic with the president. While the
estimated coefficient for the last NDC term (1997-2000) is insignificant (p = 0.119) when
the population share of the Asante is used instead, it points in the same direction.
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Table 2.3: Ewe and Asante districts’ economic prosperity by governments 1992-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable Log Nighttime Lights
Ewe Majority x (1997-2000) -0.218** -0.203**
(0.090) (0.091)
Ewe Majority x (2001-2004) -0.152 -0.122
(0.109) (0.116)
Ewe Majority x (2005-2008) -0.378*** -0.333**
(0.119) (0.133)
Share of Ewe x (1997-2000) -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Share of Ewe x (2001-2004) -0.004** -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Share of Ewe x (2005-2008) -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
Asante Majority x (1997-2000) -0.354** -0.340***
(0.135) (0.129)
Asante Majority x (2001-2004) -0.398*** -0.370***
(0.131) (0.112)
Asante Majority x (2005-2008) -0.409*** -0.367***
(0.119) (0.117)
Share of Asante x (1997-2000) -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Share of Asante x (2001-2004) -0.007*** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.002)
Share of Asante x (2005-2008) -0.006*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760
Within R2 0.289 0.324 0.294 0.327 0.294 0.328 0.296 0.327
Number of clusters 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
District & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Presidential term FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urbanization, Schooling 2000 x Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Hence, in addition to the finding that co-ethnicity is not only not beneficial but actually
disadvantageous in the Ghanaian context, the situation is even gloomier for the two
politically invested groups of the Ewe and Asante: Even in periods when they are not
co-ethnic with the incumbent president, they are worse off compared to the remainder of
the country when their fierce political opponents are in power. However, this empirical
pattern is entirely consistent with the predictions of the probabilistic voting theory: Both
the NDC and the NPP can rely on the strong ideological bias of the Ewe and the Asante
respectively. Therefore, neither party receives a payoff in terms of additional votes from
redirecting economic resources neither towards the Ewe nor the Asante homelands. If the
latter’s inhabitants are tied to one of the two parties, they provide overwhelming support
for it anyway, while they cannot be swayed by prospects of positive redistribution made
by the other party. In fact, the ideological bias of both of the politically invested groups
appears to be so strong that the respective party to which they are tied can actually
redirect resources away from them.
2.5.2 Close voting, ethnicity and economic prosperity
The first column of Table 2.4 reports results from estimating Equation 2.3 using the
vote margin between the NDC and the NPP as the measure of electoral competitiveness
while not taking any measures of ethnicity into account yet. Sign and significance of
the estimated coefficient confirm the finding of Banful (2011) that economic prosperity
is negatively associated with the district-level vote margin of presidential elections in the
sample period: A one-percentage point larger vote margin translates into exp(−0.007)−1 =−0.007% lower nighttime lights intensity on average. Hence, the tighter the electoral
outcome, the stronger the surplus in economic prosperity in the following presidential
term. This finding is robust to the inclusion of the district trends (column 2). Adding
a squared term of the vote margin (column 3) does not indicate a relevant nonlinearity
in the politico-economic relationship. Interacting the vote margin with the dummies for
the presidential terms (column 4) further suggests that the effect of the former does not
vary substantially across the latter; the weak statistical significance of the interactions
eventually disappears with the inclusion of the district-level trends (column 5).
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Table 2.4: Close elections and economic prosperity 1992-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Variable Log Nighttime Lights
Vote Margin -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.008** -0.008*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Vote Margin x (1997-2000) 0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Vote Margin x (2001-2004) 0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Vote Margin x (2005-2008) 0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Vote Margin squared 0.000
(0.000)
Observations 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760
Within R2 0.312 0.333 0.334 0.317 0.337
Number of clusters 110 110 110 110 110
District & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Presidential term FE No No No Yes Yes
Urbanization, Schooling 2000 x Trend No Yes Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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While column 1 of Table 2.5 reproduces the negative coefficient estimate of the vote mar-
gin from the previous table, column 2 then shows the result from interacting the vote
margin variable with the indicator for the Akan-dominated districts. The main effect of
the vote margin is now small in economic terms and only weakly significant, while the in-
teraction is also negative, but highly significant and large in absolute magnitude. Jointly
tested, the two coefficients are also highly significant (p = 0.000). Thus, the negative
association between close voting and economic prosperity appears to be almost entirely
driven by the close-voting behavior of the Akan-dominated districts. Controlling for the
district trends further eliminates the statistical significance of the vote margin coefficient
(column 3), while leaving the joint level of significance of the two coefficients unaffected
(p = 0.002). The finding is unaltered when using the population share of the Akan instead
of the majority indicator as a measure of the Akan presence (columns 4 and 5).
It is further possible to interact the Akan-vote margin term with the indicators for the
presidential terms to test whether the association between the Akan voting and economic
prosperity changes across terms. Column 6 shows that the effect of the Akan majority
evaluated at each presidential term separately is then composed of three different co-
efficients: the coefficient of the interaction with the vote margin, the coefficient of the
interaction with the term indicator, and the estimate of the triple interaction effect of the
Akan indicator, the vote margin and the term indicator. Tested jointly, these coefficients
are insignificant for every presidential term (1997-2000: p = 0.825, 2001-2004: p = 0.603,
2005-2008: p = 0.93).
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Table 2.5: Close elections, Akan ethnicity and economic prosperity 1992-2008 I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Variable Log Nighttime Lights
Vote Margin -0.007*** -0.003* -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.005** -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Vote Margin x Akan Majority -0.010** -0.011*** -0.012** -0.011*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Vote Margin x Share of Akan -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Vote Margin x (1997-2000) 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Vote Margin x (2001-2004) 0.005** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
Vote Margin x (2005-2008) 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Akan Majority x (1997-2000) -0.041 0.075
(0.187) (0.190)
Akan Majority x (2001-2004) 0.131 0.303
(0.230) (0.236)
Akan Majority x (2005-2008) -0.019 0.211
(0.247) (0.266)
Vote Margin x Akan Majority x (1997-2000) 0.012** 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006)
Vote Margin x Akan Majority x (2001-2004) -0.000 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008)
Vote Margin x Akan Majority x (2005-2008) 0.010 0.006
(0.008) (0.008)
Observations 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760
Within R2 0.312 0.326 0.349 0.322 0.346 0.347 0.372
Number of clusters 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
District & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Presidential term FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Urbanization, Schooling 2000 x Trend No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Next, the indicator for the tightest decile of the vote margin instead of the vote margin
itself is inserted in Equation 2.3. As a consequence of the tightening elections, the tightest
decile of the 1992 election comprises vote margins up to 10.3 pp, for example, while this
upper limit of the same decile shrinks to 5.8 pp for the 1996 election. As reported in
column 1 of Table 2.6, districts that move into the tightest decile of the vote margin over
time experience a significant increase in their nighttime lights intensity of exp(0.156) −
1 = 16.88% on average. This positive association between close voting and economic
prosperity is robust to the inclusion of the district-level trends; it hence corresponds to
the negative effect of the vote margin reported in the previous table. Interacting the
decile indicator with the Akan majority indicator also has a similar effect on the measure
of the electoral tightness as before: Both without (column 3) and with district-level trends
(column 4), the estimated coefficient of the decile indicator itself decreases in magnitude
and loses significance, while the interaction in comparison is large in magnitude and
significant. Irrespective of the district-level trends, the two estimates are jointly highly
significant (p = 0.000 without district-levels trends, p = 0.004 with district-level trends
included). However, the results differ in comparison to the ones obtained from using the
vote margin as the tightness measure when interacting the Akan-decile interaction further
with the presidential term indicators, as reported in column 5. The marginal effects of
the Akan majority are now significantly different from zero for every term (1997-2000:
p = 0.005, 2001-2004: p = 0.002, 2005-2008: p = 0.077). The sum of the three coefficients
of interest is positive for each presidential term, with the largest marginal effect of close
voting in an Akan-dominated district occurring during the term 2001-2004. This makes
sense given this term follows the first election since the return to democracy in which the
former dictator Rawlings could not run for office again, thereby potentially weakening
the position of the NDC, with the NPP making use of this opportunity by swaying Akan
voters into its camp with promises of future economic compensation.
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Table 2.6: Close elections, Akan ethnicity and economic prosperity 1992-2008 II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable Log Nighttime Lights
First Decile 0.156*** 0.114** 0.052 0.033 0.289*** 0.185
(0.044) (0.044) (0.065) (0.064) (0.099) (0.115)
First Decile x Akan Majority 0.186** 0.145* 0.444** 0.279
(0.084) (0.080) (0.214) (0.239)
First Decile x (1997-2000) -0.381*** -0.335***
(0.088) (0.116)
First Decile x (2001-2004) -0.438*** -0.257*
(0.131) (0.137)
First Decile x (2005-2008) -0.215 -0.131
(0.138) (0.171)
Akan Majority x (1997-2000) 0.434** 0.445**
(0.179) (0.173)
Akan Majority x (2001-2004) 0.286 0.364*
(0.205) (0.193)
Akan Majority x (2005-2008) 0.405* 0.525***
(0.211) (0.198)
First Decile x Akan Majority x (1997-2000) -0.363 -0.114
(0.249) (0.281)
First Decile x Akan Majority x (2001-2004) -0.058 0.008
(0.295) (0.303)
First Decile x Akan Majority xx (2005-2008) -0.531* -0.370
(0.304) (0.324)
Observations 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760
Within R2 0.290 0.323 0.292 0.325 0.318 0.353
Number of clusters 110 110 110 110 110 110
District & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Presidential term FE No No No No Yes Yes
Urbanization, Schooling 2000 x Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Conversely, interacting the vote margin variable with the indicators for the other ethnic
groups does not any comparable effect. As reported in Table 2.7, the main effect of the
vote margin remains negative and highly significant in the presence of the interactions.
Only the interaction with the indicator for the Grusi group is significant, but its sign is
positive (columns 7 and 8), while all other interaction effects are not statistically different
from zero (columns 1-6). Essentially the same results are obtained when interchanging
the vote margin with the indicator for the first decile, as shown in Table 2.8. While there
is a weakly significant and negative interaction effect of the Gurma group and the decile
indicator, it is worth mentioning that there is only one district in the sample where the
Gurma represent the majority population which finds itself in the first vote margin decile
only during one presidential term.
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Table 2.7: Close elections, other ethnicities and economic prosperity 1992-2008 I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable Log Nighttime Lights
Vote Margin -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ga-Adangbe Majority omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Ga-Adangbe Majority x Vote Margin 0.011 0.010
(0.007) (0.006)
Mole Majority omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Mole Majority x Vote Margin -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Gurma Majority omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Gurma Majority x Vote Margin -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
Grusi Majority omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Grusi Majority x Vote Margin 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760
Within R2 0.315 0.336 0.312 0.333 0.312 0.333 0.312 0.333
Number of clustered 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
District & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urbanization, Schooling 2000 x Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Close elections, other ethnicities and economic prosperity 1992-2008 II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Variable Log Nighttime Lights
First Decile 0.156*** 0.114** 0.176*** 0.131*** 0.156*** 0.118*** 0.158*** 0.115**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
Ga-Adangbe Majority omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Ga-Adangbe Majority x First Decile omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Mole Majority omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Mole Majority x First Decile -0.245 -0.208
(0.180) (0.154)
Gurma Majority omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Gurma Majority x First Decile -0.017 -0.158*
(0.064) (0.082)
Grusi Majority omitted omitted
(.) (.)
Grusi Majority x First Decile -0.079 -0.035
(0.051) (0.051)
Observations 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760
Within R2 0.290 0.323 0.292 0.324 0.290 0.323 0.291 0.323
Number of clustered 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
District & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urbanization, Schooling 2000 x Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.6 Discussion
A first observation from the previous sections that warrants discussion is the increasing
competitiveness of the Ghanaian elections over time. Why have both the national and
district-level vote margins of the 1992 election not been as close as those of the 2004
election? A potential explanation is that with Ghana’s return to democracy in 1992,
the Ghanaian society just began to accumulate what Persson & Tabellini (2009) label as
democratic capital. The stock of democratic capital reflects the stability of democracy
as a system of governance. This stability, in turn, is tested and demonstrated e.g. by
democratic transitions of power, which happened in the year 2000 for the first time in the
Ghanaian case. Prior to that, the stability of democracy might very well have seemed
questionable with the former dictator holding the office of the president and his political
aides potentially controlling the institutions of governance already since the beginning of
Rawlings’ military rule in 1981. But once democracy had proven itself to be dependable
by another round of free elections in 1996 and a peaceful transition of power in 2000, the
stock of democratic capital might have risen sufficiently to open up opportunities for both
parties and voters for more intense democratic competition.
Next, the observed economic penalty for the two co-ethnic groups and the simultaneous
favoritism of the close-voting Akan-dominated districts bring the potential reasons for this
politico-economic equilibrium into focus. It appears particularly puzzling why the Akan
do not grant more generous vote margins to the Asante-led NPP. Recall that ethnically,
the Asante belong to the Akan family, which is why the two groups are more closely
related to each other than each of them is to any other ethnic group in Ghana.
A historical perspective (Ward, 1966) on ethnic relations in Ghana is illuminative in
this regard: Despite the absence of widespread inter-ethnic violence in post-independence
Ghana and the common cultural and ethnic background of the Akan, the coexistence
of the various Akan groups has not always been peaceful or amicable. Instead, in the
course of the formation of the Ashanti Kingdom around 1700, the Asante had organized
themselves into a militaristic society whose power surpassed that of the neighboring Akan
tribes and kingdoms. The Asante gradually defeated the latter and made them tributaries
to their empire during the 18th century. At the height of the Ashanti power, only the
most northern territories, as well as the Akan-Fante tribes along the coast line and the
Ewe in today’s Volta region were not subjected to the empire’s power.
At that time, the Europeans, mostly the British and Danes, possessed only a number
of forts along the coast, which however played an important role in the transatlantic
slave trade. Slaves were predominantly provided by the Ashanti empire in exchange for
European weapons. The slaves, in turn, were either captives from the wars of the Asante
against their neighbors or turned in as part of tributary agreements of the Asante with the
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already subjected Akan tribes. The Fante, whose homeland housed the European forts,
first acted as intermediaries between the Asante and the Europeans (Hargrove, 2015),
but then saw themselves increasingly confronted with the danger of an Asante invasion,
too. This danger was only averted by a series of military British interventions against the
Asante, which however lasted over almost the entire 19th century and only came to an
end with the establishment of a British protectorate over Ashanti in 1897.
The transatlantic slave trade has been found to exert a persistent negative influence on
inter-ethnic trust across Africa in the long-run (Nunn, 2011). In the context of the strained
historical relation between the Asante and their proximate Akan neighbors, one potential
explanation for why the Akan groups surrounding the present-day Ashanti region are
reluctant to support the Asante unconditionally in the realm of politics is that the Akan
do not have a strong ideological preference for an Asante-led government due to persistent
distrust towards the latter. Instead, the Akan might prefer to constrain the political power
of the Asante by signaling that while the NPP has the possibility to gain the votes of the
Akan, it can never take them for granted, in particular not without providing benefits in
return. Empirical investigations that could serve to back up this hypothesis are currently
constrained by the lack of data on inter-ethnic trust in Ghana. While the Afrobarometer
(2015) asks respondents how much they trust their own ethnic group and how much they
trust other ethnicities in the respective country, its Ghanaian samples neither differentiate
between the Akan and the Asante with regard to the identity of the respondents, nor do
they differentiate between the other Ghanaian ethnicities with regard to the degree of
trust that the respondents have towards them.
Besides the ethnic perspective, it should be kept in mind that the south of Ghana is
generally more developed than the northern regions in terms of infrastructure, living
standards and economic performance. Jedwab & Moradi (2016) find evidence that this
economic gradient has largely been set up during Ghana’s colonial period. Nowadays, it
is potentially related to the household utilization of devices such as radio, television and
the internet, which facilitate political information and campaigning. Evidence from Sierra
Leone (Casey, 2015) suggests that radio broadcasting is important as a means to inform
voters and to make them cross traditional ethnic-party lines. The economic backlog of
the northern regions of Ghana could then translate into greater costs or difficulties for
politicians to address the voters residing there. This in turn could disparately hinder the
NPP in particular from campaigning effectively for votes in the north if the Northerners
could not be exposed to new politicians and political programs, given that the NPP was
the newcomer on the political landscape at the end of the Rawlings military rule. The
sustained growth of the Ghanaian economy since the return to democracy clearly has the
potential to diminish this potential economic obstacle, but at least regarding the sample
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period used for this study, there is no evidence that the northern ethnicities have at some
point been incorporated into the interplay of close voting and economic transfers yet.
Finally, the finding that close-voting Akan districts appear to be economically favored
naturally raises the question how this favoritism materializes. While the methodological
choice of nighttime lights as the outcome variable in the presented regressions reflects the
approval of nighttime lights as a general proxy for economic prosperity, it clearly limits
the possibilities to explore what the respective districts actually receive as a consequence
of their contested votes. Official data publications on subnational conditions in terms of
poverty, education and health, while scarce, might be able to provide at least suggestive
evidence on the channels of favoritism in Ghana.
2.7 Conclusion
This study examines ethnic favoritism under the aspect of competitive, democratic elec-
tions in the ethnically diverse West African nation of Ghana. Its results suggest that the
two co-ethnic ethnicities become economically disadvantaged in relative terms soon after
the country’s return to democracy. Further, there is a positive association between close
voting and economic prosperity with regard to the politically unaffiliated group of the
Akan. Taken together, while there is no evidence for ethnic favoritism between a political
leader and her co-ethnics in Ghana, ethnic favoritism can exist outside of this particular
constellation. Indeed, the Ghanaian case exemplifies the insight of the probabilistic voting
theory that in a politico-ethnic setup where the votes of a politically unaffiliated group,
here an ethnicity, are ‘up for grabs’, both ethnically tied parties engage in attempts to
sway these votes into their respective camp by promises of economic redistribution.
The presented results stir a considerable number of new and further questions for re-
search, some of which are expounded in Section 2.6. Additional data sources have to be
brought up to conduct the necessary empirical investigations into both the roots and the
functioning of ethnic favoritism in Ghana.
The more recent years of Ghana’s democracy promise to provide even more insights into
the role of ethnicity in the framework of political competition: Since 2008, co-ethnicity
with the governing party has not translated into co-ethnicity with the president anymore.
This opens up opportunities for new interactions between the ethnic and the political
sphere that may dissolve (or reinforce) the patterns detected within the sample period of
this study. Simultaneously, the competitiveness of Ghanaian elections has remained very
high. Ghanaian voters hence remain reluctant towards granting unconditional support to
their governments, thereby providing rich opportunities for future research.
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Chapter 3




Applications of nighttime lights to economics in general and to development economics
in particular have become increasingly popular over the recent years (see Donaldson &
Storeygard (2016) and Huang et al. (2014) for comprehensive reviews). Typically, night-
time lights are intended to proxy economic variables in settings where the data sources
for the latter are either unavailable and/or unreliable. Therefore, the attractiveness of
nighttime lights is undoubtedly born out of necessity. Consecutive and global data on
nighttime lights are currently available in yearly intervals for the time period from 1992
to 2013. This period is marked both by the urge for and by the prevalent absence of
reliable, consistent, and sufficiently frequent quantitative measurements of economic ad-
vancement across the world. Official statistics from developing countries are particularly
rarely available below the regional level and if they are, they are often the result of small-
area estimations which are not only data-intensive and therefore infrequent, but also not
without caveats (Deaton & Tarozzi, 2009). Hence, one cannot evade the idea that if night-
time lights contained any relevant information that could supplement and even extent the
existing data, then they should indeed be made use of as far as possible.
The wide range of applications raises the question what nighttime lights then actually
are if they apparently represent a strong and universal proxy variable. A rather blunt,
but not necessarily incorrect response would suggest that nighttime lights are whatever
variable the specific research question needs them to be. However, their strong proxy
properties are certainly not accepted prima facie: Fortunately, it is considered good prac-
tice to test the applicability of nighttime lights to the respective research context, mostly
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by correlating them against the variables to be proxied over those time periods and levels
of aggregation for which data are at least partially available. But because the diversity of
applications has become so vast, the respective tests of applicability, while valid on their
own, are not directly comparable with each other, making it difficult to derive general
conclusions about applicability and consistency of nighttime lights from them.
For example, Henderson et al. (2012) correlate national GDP growth rates against growth
rates of nighttime lights in a cross-country panel from 1992 to 2008. Chen & Nordhaus
(2011) and Chen & Nordhaus (2015) also consider GDP and GDP growth at the national
level, while adding very disaggregated information from the level of grid cells. Hodler
& Raschky (2014) test their panel dataset of regional nighttime lights with the help of
regional GDP data collected by Gennaioli et al. (2013), but the set of countries for which
the regional GDP is available is both smaller than the set of countries that Hodler &
Raschky (2014) consider in their full analysis and than the set of countries used by Hen-
derson et al. (2012). Bhandari & Roychowdhury (2011) also apply nighttime lights at the
sub-national level, but their correlations of nighttime lights and GDP are estimated at
the more disaggregated level of districts. Further, they use a single cross-section of data
and restrict their sample to the country of India. Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013),
in turn, focus on the sub-national level of sub-Saharan African countries and correlate
their cross-sectional nighttime lights data against a composite wealth index constructed
at the level of enumeration areas of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) across
four countries.
On top of all these different levels of aggregations, time frames, outcomes and countries,
furthermore also the exact computation of the nighttime lights measure is not the same
across applications, but mostly varies between using lights per pixel versus lights per
capita across a delimited territory. This ever-increasing diversity of applications does not
raise any doubts about the validity of nighttime lights in all these specific contexts, but
at the same time, it impairs the derivation of general statements about the consistency
of nighttime lights applications.
This paper takes a systematic approach to evaluate the applicability and consistency of
nighttime lights in the development nexus. By “systematic”, I mean that the approach
attempts to hold as many elements of the empirical framework fixed as possible while
switching single parameters on and off one after another. The elements that I hold fixed
permanently in the following are the sources of the data, the time frame, the country
identity, and the variables that the nighttime lights are supposed to correlate with. Doing
so allows me to examine the applicability and consistency of nighttime lights along two
important dimensions: Firstly, the level of spatial aggregation can be shifted between
the regional and the more disaggregated district level. Secondly, the correlations can be
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estimated either by pooling all observations or by exploiting the panel structure of my
data. While the four resulting combinations are by far not exhaustive of the applica-
tion potential of nighttime lights, they still provide some relatively clean-cut evidence on
the questions whether nighttime lights can be discretionarily utilized in different spatial
frameworks without loss of consistency and whether nighttime lights correlate as well with
variables in levels as with their changes over time.
The results show that nighttime lights significantly correlate with two consistently mea-
sures variables of interest from the development context across all four combinations of
applications. The correlations appear to be stronger in terms of the estimated slope at the
higher level of spatial aggregation, while they are equally stronger in the cross-sectional
applications compared to the applications which exploit the panel structure.
Section 3.2 presents the data, while Section 3.3 outlines the empirical strategy of the
evaluation. Section 3.4 presents the estimation results. Section 3.5 concludes and pro-
vides some suggestions for applying night lights as a proxy variable in the context of
development.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Nighttime lights data
The utilized nighttime lights dataset is the Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time
Series provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).1 It
is identical to the one commonly used in the literature and covers the period from 1992
to 2013. A total of six different satellites were involved in the recording process. Due to
the dissemination of the dataset, detailed descriptions of this process and of the general
properties of the data are omitted at this point. In brief, the yearly data is composed of
pixels containing information on the average visible, stable lights. Each pixel is assigned
a value of nighttime lights intensity between 0 and 63, with 63 representing the maximum
level of luminosity that the satellites can record. The NOAA data are therefore affected
by the technical problem of both top- and bottom-coding: In economically advanced and
densely populated areas, the satellite data do not show any variation above the peak value
of 63, while they are also invariant across areas that do not exhibit any stable lights.
The calculations of the mean value of nighttime lights within a georeferenced area are per-
formed by the software QGIS (2017). While there are no self-evident provisions whether
nighttime lights per geographic area, nighttime lights per capita, or some other form of
population-adjusted nighttime lights variable are the superior transformation of choice,
1Image and data processing by NOAA’s National Geophysical Data Center. DMSP data collected by
US Air Force Weather Agency.
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the focus is laid on the logarithm of nighttime lights per geographic area in the following,
as this measure is the most universal one in the sense that it does not depend on the
availability of additional data such as population figures. Instead, the nighttime lights
per geographic area are simply the result of the software counting the total number of
pixels that are comprised within an area’s boundary, summing up the luminosity values
of the pixels within the same area, and dividing the sum by the total number of pixels.
Before taking logs, the value 0.01 is added to each observation in order to avoid observa-
tions dropping out of the sample because their average luminosity is zero, i.e. they are
completely unlit.
3.2.2 Development data
IPUMS-International (2017) provides comprehensive extracts from census micro data for
various developing countries. These extracts qualify for my analysis because firstly, they
contain multiple variables which are of general interest in the context of development
economics. Secondly, the data cover two subsequent census waves for several countries,
allowing it to either pool all the observations or to arrange the data in a panel format and
exploit only within-group changes over time.2 Thirdly, they contain georeferenced infor-
mation regarding both the first and the second sub-national level of the administrative
location of every observation. I refer to administrative divisions at the first sub-national
level as ‘regions’ and to administrative divisions at the second sub-national level as ‘dis-
tricts’. The census extracts are designed such that by using the specified weights, the
aggregation of the individual- and household-level information to the respective admin-
istrative level yields representative averages. The location information is furthermore
spatially harmonized over time, meaning that within each country, the number of regions
and districts is hypothetically held constant over time, which greatly facilitates the ar-
rangement of the data in panel format.
Fortunately, IPUMS-International (2017) also provides georeferenced maps for each coun-
try with harmonized external and internal administrative boundaries over time. I utilize
the maps to calculate the mean of the nighttime lights within each administrative division,
which can then be easily matched with the census information. In addition, I determine
the latitudes and longitudes of the centroids of every administrative unit. A complete list
of countries included in the sample together with summary statistics for the variables can
be found in the appendix to this chapter.3
I select two variables from the census extracts data that I correlate against nighttime
2The first census year in the sample is 1998, the last one is 2011.
3Countries in the sample: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ecuador, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Zambia. Number
of regions: 186. Number of districts: 1482.
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lights in my application: the average rate of electrification of households and the average
years of schooling of the population within each district or region. This choice is partly
determined by the fact that among all variables, these two are most frequently available
for countries for which there is also more than one wave of census data. Nevertheless, both
variables can also be assumed to be quite comparable across countries and they are both
frequently incorporated in multidimensional poverty indices, hinting at their relevance in
the development context. Finally, electrification and schooling are interesting to correlate
against nighttime lights because with regard to electrification, it is easy to presume a
strong technical relationship with the local area’s luminosity, while with regard to school-
ing, there is less reason to expect a strong relationship a priori. Additionally, I compute
the total population of each administrative unit in order to then obtain a measure of
population density by dividing the population figure by the number of pixels comprised
by the respective unit’s boundaries.
While variables that are directly related to income would also be very interesting to
correlate against nighttime lights, such information is typically not recorded by census
statistics. The dataset on regional GDP collected by Gennaioli et al. (2013) is not pub-
licly available and even if it was, it would actually deprive my analysis of the possibility
of shifting between different levels of spatial aggregation. Small-area poverty estimates
obtained by applying the methodology by Elbers et al. (2003) are available for a number
of developing countries and have been correlated against nighttime lights by Chen (2015).
However, they are not directly comparable to GDP and they cannot be simply aggregated




Applicability and consistency of nighttime lights are to be evaluated based on their corre-
lations with the two development outcomes at the two different levels of spatial aggrega-
tion and within the cross-sectional, as well as the longitudinal framework. Consequently,
the basic setup consists of regressing the outcome y on the logarithm of nighttime lights
ln(Lights) in order to estimate the parameter β1. The logarithm of the population den-
sity ln(PopulationDensity) is added as the single control variable that varies at the
spatial, as well as at the temporal level. However, as Bickenbach et al. (2016) point out,
control variables should actually not strongly affect the correlations because the need for
control variables would undermine the universal applicability of nighttime lights. Year
fixed effects in every specification control for the effect of changing satellites recording
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the nighttime lights. When pooling the observations from all time periods, longitude and
latitude of each district’s or region’s centroid are included in order to reduce any spatial
autocorrelation, resulting in the following specification at the regional level which can be
estimated by OLS:
yj = β0 + β1ln(Lights)j + β2ln(PopulationDensity)j + γ1Xj + γ2Yj + δY eart + j (3.1)
When estimating the relationship at the district level, the error terms are allowed to be
correlated at the regional level, advising the clustering of the standard errors at the same
level:
yi = β0 + β1ln(Lights)i + β2ln(PopulationDensity)i + γ1Xi + γ2Yi + δY eart + ij (3.2)
In order to exploit the panel structure of the data, group fixed effects absorb all time-
invariant heterogeneity between the observations, estimating β1 only from within-region
variation:
yjt = β0 + β1ln(Lights)jt + β2ln(PopulationDensity)jt + αRegionj + δY eart + jt (3.3)
The corresponding model at the district level reads:
yit = β0 + β1ln(Lights)it + β2ln(PopulationDensity)it + αDistricti + δY eart + it (3.4)
The errors are allowed to be serially correlated within groups, which suggests clustering
the standard errors within each region respectively district over time.
3.3.2 Econometric considerations
Within the outlined estimation setup, it is worthwhile to consider econometric challenges
which have the potential to affect the consistency of the estimation of β1, the parameter
of the nighttime lights measure, and its inference. For example, a factor exerting a down-
ward bias on the estimated standard errors of β1 increases the danger of type I errors,
i.e. of incorrectly rejecting the null of no significant relationship between the development
outcomes and nighttime lights, while a downward bias on the parameter estimate may
result in type II errors, i.e. of incorrectly inferring no significant relationship when it is
actually there. It is particularly useful to consider these challenges along the two dimen-
sions of district vs. region and pooled vs. panel, as the estimation setup intends to make
shifts along one dimension while keeping the other one fixed.
First, Henderson et al. (2012) assume that both the outcome variable, in their case GDP
growth, and the nighttime lights variable are each measured with ‘classical’ measurement
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errors, with the errors being uncorrelated between the two variables. It as a standard
result from econometric theory (Pischke, 2007) that measurement error in the dependent
variable does not affect the consistency of the OLS estimates of β1, but only inflates
the estimated standard errors. Measurement error in the explanatory variable, however,
causes an ‘attenuation’ bias in the estimates of β1, i.e. biases them towards zero. Thus,
under the assumption of measurement errors in both the development outcomes and the
nighttime lights, all conventional OLS estimates of β1 underestimate the true relationship
between the outcomes and the nighttime lights. Furthermore, it is well-established that
the attenuation bias from the measurement error in the explanatory variable is aggravated
if β1 is estimated within the framework of a fixed-effects model such as Equation 3.3 and
Equation 3.4. This results from the within-transformation wiping out a lot of variation
from the data, leaving only deviations from the group means to estimate the parameter,
thereby diminishing the signal-to-noise ratio and amplifying the effect of the measurement
error as part of the noise. Consequently, under the assumption of measurement errors in
both the development outcomes and the nighttime lights, all fixed-effect estimates of β1
will be smaller in terms of absolute size than the estimates of β1 obtained from the pooled
regressions.
Second, the disaggregated application of nighttime lights introduces an econometric prob-
lem that is not considered by Henderson et al. (2012) and Chen & Nordhaus (2011)
because it is not relevant at the national level that they consider: Breaking down the
spatial unit of observation into ever smaller parts increases the number of observations
that are either top-coded because all pixels within them have a luminosity value of 63 or
bottom-coded because all pixels are completely unlit. For example, on the national level,
the mean nighttime lights intensity never takes the value 0 nor the value 63 (excluding
city states), but disaggregating a developing country into its metropolitan and remote
areas respectively will result in some fully and some unlit observations. This is equivalent
to the nighttime lights measure being both left- and right-censored at the sub-national
level, with the frequency of censoring increasing in the level of disaggregation. Indeed,
while only five regions in the sample are completely unlit and no region is fully lit, 24.90%
of the district-level observations have a mean luminosity of zero and 0.13% are top-coded.
Figure 3.1 displays histograms of the distributions of the logarithm of nighttime lights at
(a) the district and (b) the regional level.
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Figure 3.1: Histograms of nighttime lights at two levels of aggregation
(a) Regions (b) Districts
While the econometric literature has dealt extensively with the effects of a censored de-
pendent variables, the effects of censoring in the explanatory variable have received less
attention. Only relatively recently, Rigobon & Stoker (2007) and Rigobon & Stoker (2009)
have shown that left-censoring in the regressor causes attenuation bias if, graphically
speaking, the left-censored observations have their center of mass above the regression
line, thereby ‘pulling’ the regression line upwards at its lower end, which is equivalent to
attenuating its slope. Figure 3.3 shows scatter plots of the two development outcomes
against the (log) nighttime lights in levels using the district-level observations. At the
lower end of the nighttime lights spectrum, a large number of censored observations in-
deed piles up around the estimated best linear fit line, with the majority being located
above the line. While the plots are noisier when the regional observations are used instead
(Figure 3.2), there is much less indication of censored observations piling up at either the
low- or the high-end of the nighttime lights spectrum. Given the strong prevalence of left-
censoring in the district sample of nighttime lights, regressions estimating the nighttime
lights parameter β1 at the district level are expected to suffer more from attenuation bias
than regressions at the regional level.
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Figure 3.2: Scatter plots in levels at the regional level
(a) Years of Schooling (b) Electrification
Figure 3.3: Scatter plots in levels at the district level
(a) Years of Schooling (b) Electrification
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Results at the regional level
Table 3.1 reports results from regressing the schooling measure on nighttime lights and
the expanding set of controls on the regional level. The raw correlation (column 1) re-
main positive and strongly significant with the addition of the population density measure
(column 2), longitudes and latitudes (column 3), and the year fixed effects (column 4).
Based on the most exhaustive specification, a 1% increase in nighttime lights intensity
is associated with 0.005 more years of schooling. The estimates are naturally smaller
(electrification is bound between 0 and 1), but similarly robust when the regional electri-
fication rate is used as the dependent variable (Table 3.2), suggesting that 1% increase in
nighttime lights intensity is associated with a 0.001 higher electrification rate.
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Table 3.1: Pooled regressions of nighttime lights and schooling at the regional level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Years of Schooling
Log Nighttime Lights 0.630*** 0.816*** 0.791*** 0.495***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.083) (0.079)
Log Population Density -0.382*** -0.343*** -0.135*
(0.083) (0.098) (0.082)
Observations 186 186 186 186
R-squared 0.498 0.571 0.630 0.749
Longitude/Latitude No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.2: Pooled regressions of nighttime lights and electrification at the regional level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Electrification
Log Nighttime Lights 0.117*** 0.164*** 0.137*** 0.111***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016)
Log Population Density -0.097*** -0.070*** -0.052***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 186 186 186 186
R-squared 0.530 0.677 0.770 0.809
Longitude/Latitude No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
When only accounting for region fixed effects in table 3.3, the raw correlation (column
1) between schooling and nighttime lights is actually estimated to be of larger magnitude
than in the cross-sectional specification. However, after adding the population density
control (column 2) and accounting for the year fixed effects, the parameter is quantita-
tively smaller (column 3), but still highly significant in statistical terms. With regard to
electrification (Table 3.4), the estimated coefficients also drops in size by about two-thirds
once all controls are included, but remain significant (p-value in column 3: 0.011).
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Table 3.3: Panel regressions of nighttime lights and schooling at the regional level
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Years of Schooling
Log Nighttime Lights 1.095*** 0.811*** 0.311***
(0.078) (0.067) (0.077)
Log Population Density 1.283*** 0.108
(0.155) (0.392)
Observations 186 186 186
R-squared 0.698 0.785 0.906
Number of Clusters 93 93 93
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered within regions in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: Panel regressions of nighttime lights and electrification at the regional level
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Electrification
Log Nighttime Lights 0.097*** 0.049*** 0.032**
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
Log Population Density 0.215*** 0.155***
(0.029) (0.053)
Observations 186 186 186
R-squared 0.377 0.545 0.761
Number of Clusters 93 93 93
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered within regions in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.4.2 Results at the district level
Table 3.5 reports results from district-level regressions of the schooling measure on
nighttime lights and the various controls. All estimates of the nighttime lights parameter
are positive and highly significant, suggesting that about 0.004 more years of schooling
are associated with a 1% stronger nighttime lights intensity. Notably, variation in
nighttime lights alone explains more than 50% of the district-level variation in schooling
(column 1). The estimated coefficients are also strongly significant with regard to the
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electrification measure. Again, without any controls, nighttime lights already explain
48% of the variation in the outcome measure (column 1).
Table 3.5: Pooled regressions of nighttime lights and schooling at the district level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Years of Schooling
Log Nighttime Lights 0.483*** 0.510*** 0.463*** 0.372***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.041) (0.035)
Log Population Density -0.064 0.011 0.079
(0.069) (0.051) (0.048)
Observations 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
R-squared 0.545 0.547 0.618 0.712
Number of Clusters 93 93 93 93
Longitude/Latitude No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered within regions in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Pooled regressions of nighttime lights and electrification at the district level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable Electrification
Log Nighttime Lights 0.080*** 0.103*** 0.071*** 0.060***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
Log Population Density -0.056*** -0.009 -0.006
(0.016) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 1,482 1,482 1,482 1,482
R-squared 0.482 0.541 0.679 0.727
Number of Clusters 93 93 93 93
Longitude/Latitude No No Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered within regions in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
By applying the within-estimator to Equation 3.4, all time-invariant heterogeneity be-
tween districts is wiped out. Nevertheless, the estimation retains a large, positive and
highly significant correlation between schooling and nighttime lights (Table 3.7, column
1). Accounting for year-specific shocks sharply reduces the size of the estimated param-
eter (column 3), while leaving its statistical significance unaffected. The same pattern
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emerges with regard to the association of electrification with nighttime lights (Table 3.8):
The correlations decrease in terms of magnitude, but remain positive and significant.
Table 3.7: Panel regressions of nighttime lights and schooling at the district level
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Years of Schooling
Log Nighttime Lights 0.590*** 0.445*** 0.109***
(0.039) (0.034) (0.023)
Log Population Density 1.492*** -0.378**
(0.142) (0.157)
Observations 1,482 1,482 1,482
R-squared 0.327 0.518 0.865
Number of Clusters 741 741 741
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered within districts in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Panel regressions of nighttime lights and electrification at the district level
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Electrification
Log Nighttime Lights 0.070*** 0.054*** 0.026***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log Population Density 0.171*** 0.014
(0.025) (0.046)
Observations 1,482 1,482 1,482
R-squared 0.222 0.342 0.617
Number of Clusters 741 741 741
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered within districts in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.5 Conclusion
The intention of this paper is to perform a systematic evaluation of the applicability and
consistency of nighttime lights. My findings show that firstly, nighttime lights correlate
strongly with both the electrification rate of households and the average years of schooling
in a sample of developing countries. These correlations confirm that, within my limited
framework, the applicability of nighttime lights as a proxy clearly goes beyond variables
which feature a somewhat direct relationship to the emittance of lights such as electri-
fication or industrial production, as the association of nighttime lights and schooling is
equally strong in terms of statistical significance and also linear in shape.
Secondly, shifting the level of spatial aggregation from the regional to the district level
does not impair the ability of nighttime lights to correlate with the two development out-
comes. While the district level is far from exhaustive with regard to the possibilities of
disaggregating nighttime lights (or other remote sensing data), the district is already a
relatively small administrative entity, suggesting that nighttime lights bear the potential
to be usefully applied also within individual countries if the number of disaggregated ad-
ministrative units is large enough in order to provide sufficient spatial variation.
Thirdly, nighttime lights remain strongly correlated with electrification and schooling even
if a large amount of variation is discarded by estimating fixed-effects models and identify-
ing the parameter of nighttime lights only from within-region or within-district variation.
This suggests that nighttime lights are not just a stationary spatial feature, but that they
co-evolve with the underlying economic, demographic and social patterns. However, the
temporal gap between two observations of the same spatial unit is quite large in my sample
due to the fact that population censuses in particular in developing countries are rarely
performed more than once per decade. It would therefore be worthwhile to attempt to
construct a similarly comparable dataset in which however the observations are recorded
at shorter frequencies in order to assess whether nighttime lights pick up year-to-year
variation in the outcomes as well as variation accumulated over several years.
Taken as a whole, the results of this evaluation suggest that nighttime lights maintain
their consistency as a proxy variable when varying the parameters of the application sys-
tematically along the spatial and temporal dimension respectively. The assessment that
nighttime lights correlate strongly and quite unconditionally with the years of schooling
as a measure of educational attainment might be interpreted as particularly encouraging
in the context of developing countries where disaggregated and consecutive educational
data are at least as rare as GDP-related data. The correlation between nighttime lights
and schooling further calls for replacing schooling with rather quality- and skills-oriented
measures of human capital which Hanushek & Woessmann (2012a) and Hanushek &
Woessmann (2012b) deem as much more relevant and informative than the mere length
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of education.
The fact that the estimated slope parameters are not equal across the four different regres-
sion frameworks should not immediately be interpreted as a warning sign that nighttime
lights as a proxy do not exhibit a constant quantitative association with the variables they
are supposed to reflect. I point to a series of econometric specifics that should be kept
in mind when nighttime lights act as the explanatory variable because certain properties
of the nighttime lights data can result in downward biases in the parameter estimates.
While the two specifics of classical measurement error and censoring in the explanatory
variable are unlikely to cover all econometric challenges brought up by the chosen empir-
ical framework, the size of the parameter estimates behaves exactly as the former imply
it along the lines of the latter.
With regard to future research in the domain of remote sensing and nighttime lights in
particular, it will be illuminating to examine the properties of the VIIRS-DNB4 series in
a framework similar to the one suggested in this paper once multiple yearly composites of
stable lights will be available. According to Elvidge et al. (2013), the VIIRS-DNB series
is superior to the DMSP-OLS data in terms of spatial resolution and detection limits.
Therefore, it has the potential not only to tap into even lower levels of disaggregation,
but also to alleviate the top- and bottom-coding issues at least for upcoming applications
of nighttime lights.
4Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite-Day/Night Band, Earth Observation Group, NOAA Na-
tional Geophysical Data Center
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Discontinuities in geographic characteristics at Austrian-Russian border
(a) Altitude (b) Precipitation (c) Temperature
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics at Austrian-Russian border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean SD Min Max
Population 1810 187 1413 1923.84 167 23612
Austrian-Russian Distance (m) 1910-1932 44 29,517 16,972 7,660 64,730
Austrian-Russian Distance (m) 1960 59 31,352 18,327 2,766 64,823
City Dummy 1910-1932 44 0.0455 0.211 0 1
City Dummy 1960 59 0.203 0.406 0 1
Average Altitude (m) 44 257.2 86.67 153.0 587.9
Average Temperature (Degree Celsius) 44 7.718 0.412 6.526 8.506
Average Precipitation (mm) 44 647.4 78.63 539.4 839.0
Average Caloric Yield 44 1,927 167.0 1,447 2,129
Optimal Caloric Yield 44 9,755 435.6 8,693 10,499
Share of Cropland 1800 44 0.501 0.110 0.293 0.679
Share of Cropland 1900 44 0.683 0.134 0.387 0.898
Primary Enrollment 1911 44 0.489 0.260 0.0880 0.862
Primary Enrollment 1921 44 0.720 0.168 0.409 1.006
Primary Enrollment 1926 44 0.692 0.111 0.415 1.103
Primary Enrollment 1932 44 0.994 0.0482 0.850 1.101
Primary Enrollment 1961 59 1.055 0.027 0.984 1.142
Share of Literates 1921 44 0.581 0.123 0.340 0.822
Share of Literates 1931 44 0.561 0.0799 0.402 0.806
Share of Literates 1960 59 0.954 0.0265 0.881 0.991
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1911 44 3.026 1.098 1.028 5.644
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1921 44 5.124 1.408 1.819 7.953
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1926 44 5.113 1.185 1.584 7.397
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1932 44 5.059 1.164 1.342 7.126
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1961 59 5.71 2.38 1.137 12.01
Classes Per 1,000 School-Aged 1911 44 6.580 3.757 1.069 13.78
Classes Per 1,000 School-Aged 1921 44 9.175 2.352 5.872 15.62
Classes Per 1,000 School-Aged 1926 44 15.66 3.864 7.924 21.82
Teachers Per 1,000 School-Aged 1911 44 7.152 4.137 1.028 16.55
Teachers Per 1,000 School-Aged 1921 44 12.09 3.795 6.387 25.36
Teachers Per 1,000 School-Aged 1926 44 14.69 3.483 9.754 24.77
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Table A.2: Summary statistics at Prussian-Russian border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Population 1810 165 1236.71 1566.91 126 16114
Prussian-Russian Distance (m) 1910-1932 54 32,154 18,902 6,521 64,629
Prussian-Russian Distance (m) 1960 53 34,677 18,669 3,728 64,741
City Dummy 1910-1932 54 0.0741 0.264 0 1
City Dummy 1960 53 0.208 0.409 0 1
Average Altitude (m) 54 107.0 32.23 28.27 182.6
Average Temperature (Degree Celsius) 54 7.917 0.421 7.023 8.474
Average Precipitation (mm) 54 541.3 21.01 514.4 607.4
Average Caloric Yield 54 2,023 131.2 1,686 2,213
Optimal Caloric Yield 54 9,802 340.6 8,992 10,466
Share of Cropland 1800 54 0.631 0.0448 0.517 0.695
Share of Cropland 1900 54 0.834 0.0590 0.683 0.918
Primary Enrollment 1911 54 0.693 0.395 0.0906 0.996
Primary Enrollment 1921 54 0.785 0.188 0.376 1.008
Primary Enrollment 1926 54 0.744 0.0816 0.506 0.922
Primary Enrollment 1932 54 1.010 0.0634 0.901 1.138
Primary Enrollment 1961 53 1.065 0.045 0.904 1.250
Share of Literates 1921 54 0.669 0.124 0.459 0.844
Share of Literates 1931 54 0.654 0.106 0.451 0.808
Share of Literates 1960 53 0.964 0.028 0.912 0.998
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1911 54 5.299 3.053 0.795 11.43
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1921 54 7.078 2.184 1.051 13.70
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1926 54 7.387 2.392 0.820 11.88
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1932 54 7.242 2.454 1.181 12.42
Schools Per 1,000 School-Aged 1961 53 6.166 2.6 1.234 9.982
Classes Per 1,000 School-Aged 1911 54 12.68 7.887 1.192 24.19
Classes Per 1,000 School-Aged 1921 54 11.70 3.701 4.956 20.45
Classes Per 1,000 School-Aged 1926 54 16.48 3.470 5.474 21.96
Teachers Per 1,000 School-Aged 1911 54 10.03 5.960 1.192 19.05
Teachers Per 1,000 School-Aged 1921 54 11.16 2.421 6.359 18.96
Teachers Per 1,000 School-Aged 1926 54 15.19 2.328 9.027 20.68
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Table A.3: Primary enrollment at Prussian-Russian border 1911-1961
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Prussian Side = 1 0.828*** 0.829*** 0.832***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.995 0.996 0.996
Mean on Russian Side 0.164 0.164 0.164
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.397*** 0.402*** 0.409***
(0.052) (0.036) (0.038)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.784 0.905 0.913
Mean on Russian Side 0.562 0.562 0.562
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Prussian Side = 1 0.075* 0.080*** 0.079***
(0.038) (0.029) (0.029)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.098 0.651 0.652
Mean on Russian Side 0.711 0.711 0.711
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Prussian Side = 1 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.11***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.36 0.512 0.515
Mean on Russian Side 0.961 0.961 0.961
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961 Primary Enrollment 1961
Prussian Side = 1 -0.002 -0.001 -0.017
(0.026) (0.025) (0.047)
Observations 53 53 53
R-squared 0.078 0.093 0.153
Mean on Russian Side 1.081 1.081 1.081
Distance, Distance*Prussian Side Yes Yes Yes
Long./Lat., City Dummy No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4: Primary enrollment at Austrian-Russian border 1911-1961
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Austrian Side = 1 0.486*** 0.498*** 0.485***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Observations 43 43 43
R-squared 0.902 0.921 0.926
Mean on Russian Side 0.194 0.194 0.194
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.270*** 0.275*** 0.259***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.046)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.716 0.827 0.856
Mean on Russian Side 0.554 0.554 0.554
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Austrian Side = 1 0.168*** 0.169** 0.167**
(0.057) (0.068) (0.072)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.304 0.354 0.386
Mean on Russian Side 0.627 0.627 0.627
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Austrian Side = 1 0.002 0.028 0.030
(0.030) (0.020) (0.021)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.096 0.638 0.657
Mean on Russian Side 0.981 0.981 0.981
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1960/61 Primary Enrollment 1960/61 Primary Enrollment 1960/61
Austrian Side = 1 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 59 59 59
R-squared 0.070 0.141 0.189
Mean on Russian Side 1.062 1.062 1.062
Distance, Distance*Austrian Side Yes Yes Yes
Long./Lat., City Dummy No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5: Literacy at Prussian-Russian border 1921-1960
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.248***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.933 0.954 0.967
Mean on Russian Side 0.509 0.509 0.509
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931
Prussian Side = 1 0.198*** 0.196*** 0.193***
(0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.935 0.974 0.977
Mean on Russian Side 0.517 0.517 0.517
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1960 Share of Literates 1960 Share of Literates 1960
Prussian Side = 1 0.025** 0.008 0.029***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
Observations 53 53 53
R-squared 0.474 0.655 0.884
Mean on Russian Side 0.936 0.936 0.936
Distance, Distance*Prussian Side Yes Yes Yes
Long./Lat., City Dummy No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.6: Literacy at Austrian-Russian border 1921-1960
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.270*** 0.219*** 0.200***
(0.047) (0.033) (0.038)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.697 0.868 0.879
Mean on Russian Side 0.462 0.462 0.462
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931
Austrian Side = 1 0.177*** 0.132*** 0.113***
(0.037) (0.022) (0.024)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.597 0.830 0.851
Mean on Russian Side 0.491 0.491 0.491
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1960 Share of Literates 1960 Share of Literates 1960
Austrian Side = 1 0.057*** 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 59 59 59
R-squared 0.539 0.717 0.746
Mean on Russian Side 0.934 0.934 0.934
Distance, Distance*Austrian Side Yes Yes Yes
Long./Lat., City Dummy No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.7: Enrollment at Prussian-Russian border 1911-1931, population controls
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Prussian Side = 1 0.832*** 0.846*** 0.846***
(0.018) (0.028) (0.03)
Share Jewish 0.430 0.430
(0.296) (0.3)
Share Protestant 0.059** 0.059
(0.024) (0.042)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.001
(0.109)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.996 0.997 0.997
Dep.Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.409*** 0.357*** 0.436***
(0.038) (0.067) (0.080)
Share Jewish -0.906 -0.837
(0.767) (0.794)
Share Protestant -0.026 0.121
(0.098) (0.099)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.629***
(0.212)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.913 0.917 0.924
Dep.Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Prussian Side = 1 0.079*** 0.042 0.170***
(0.029) (0.044) (0.052)
Share Jewish -0.623 -0.479
(0.461) (0.469)
Share Protestant 0.054 0.316**
(0.151) (0.142)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.949***
(0.185)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.652 0.665 0.759
Dep.Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Prussian Side = 1 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.079
(0.026) (0.034) (0.050)
Share Jewish -0.185 -0.217
(0.343) (0.353)
Share Protestant -0.048 -0.099
(0.183) (0.208)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.152
(0.210)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.515 0.518 0.522
Geo, City Controls Yes Yes Yes
Distance, Distance*Prussian Side, Long./Lat. Yes Yes Yes
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.8: Enrollment at Austrian-Russian border 1911-1931, population controls
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911 Primary Enrollment 1911
Austrian Side = 1 0.481*** 0.531*** 0.533***
(0.057) (0.053) (0.053)
Share Jewish 0.561* 0.557*
(0.306) (0.325)
Share Protestant 5.874** 0.566**
(2.157) (2.129)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.473
(0.833)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.913 0.937 0.938
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921 Primary Enrollment 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.259*** 0.165*** 0.165***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.043)
Share Jewish -1.163*** -1.300***
(0.299) (0.255)
Share Protestant -0.303 -0.529
(4.214) (4.176)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 1.546***
(0.507)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.856 0.890 0.902
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926 Primary Enrollment 1926
Austrian Side = 1 0.167** 0.136* 0.136*
(0.072) (0.077) (0.078)
Share Jewish -0.413 -0.431
(0.667) (0.688)
Share Protestant 0.164 -0.051
(3.789) (3.894)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.246
(1.043)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.386 0.393 0.394
Dep. Variable Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932 Primary Enrollment 1932
Austrian Side = 1 0.030 0.034 0.036
(0.021) (0.029) (0.026)
Share Jewish 0.055 0.024
(0.244) (0.226)
Share Protestant 0.676 -0.321
(2.019) (2.371)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.656*
(0.336)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.657 0.659 0.683
Geo, City Controls Yes Yes Yes
Distance, Distance*Austrian Side, Long./Lat. Yes Yes Yes
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.9: Literacy at Prussian-Russian border 1921-1931, population controls
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921
Prussian Side = 1 0.248*** 0.263*** 0.264***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.024)
Share Jewish 0.219 0.221
(0.253) (0.257)
Share Protestant -0.011 -0.008
(0.038) (0.049)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.014
(0.109)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.967 0.968 0.968
Mean on Russian Side 0.509 0.509 0.509
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931
Prussian Side = 1 0.193*** 0.212*** 0.240***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018)
Share Jewish 0.385** 0.426**
(0.180) (0.188)
Share Protestant 0.014 0.078
(0.081) (0.061)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 -0.191***
(0.061)
Observations 54 54 54
R-squared 0.977 0.979 0.982
Mean on Russian Side 0.517 0.517 0.517
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.10: Literacy at Austrian-Russian border 1921-1931, population controls
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921 Share of Literates 1921
Austrian Side = 1 0.200*** 0.194*** 0.194***
(0.038) (0.055) (0.052)
Share Jewish -0.043 -0.125
(0.321) (0.330)
Share Protestant 2.256 2.121
(1.535) (1.549)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.927
(0.569)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.879 0.882 0.890
Mean on Russian Side 0.462 0.462 0.462
Dep. Variable Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931 Share of Literates 1931
Austrian Side = 1 0.113*** 0.134*** 0.137***
(0.024) (0.035) (0.032)
Share Jewish 0.294 0.255
(0.249) (0.237)
Share Protestant 2.586 1.340
(1.855) (2.335)
Share Born Outside Partition 1921 0.821*
(0.406)
Observations 44 44 44
R-squared 0.851 0.865 0.879
Mean on Russian Side 0.491 0.491 0.491
Notes: One-dimensional RDD. Bandwidth 65 km. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Ethnic groups of Ghana
(a) Asante (b) Ewe
(c) Fante (d) Other Akan groups
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Figure B.1: Ethnic groups of Ghana (continued)
(e) Ga-Adangbe (f) Mole-Dagbani
(g) Gurma (h) Grusi
101
B.2 Tables
Table B.1: Summary statistics for the time period 1992-2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Log Nighttime Lights 1,760 -1.156 1.941 -4.605 4.067
Share of Ewe 1,760 11.92 21.64 0 91.47
Share of Asante 1,760 11.74 20.68 0.0511 88.24
Share of Akan (w/o Asante) 1,760 31.72 28.99 0.386 90.52
Share of Fante 1,760 8.933 19.50 0 84.54
Share of Ga-Adangbe 1,760 5.979 14.56 0.0256 81.79
Share of Mole-Dagbani 1,760 17.37 26.41 0.197 92.92
Share of Guan 1,760 4.392 8.883 0.0964 48.77
Share of Gurma 1,760 4.444 11.73 0.0685 65.19
Share of Grusi 1,760 2.928 8.029 0.0340 75.96
Share of Other Groups 1,760 1.508 3.003 0.0132 17.08
Share of Undefined Groups 1,760 7.260 4.324 0.794 28.29
Vote Margin 1,760 36.76 25.54 0.119 98.23
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Tables
Table C.1: Summary statistics for the sample at the district level
Country Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Bangladesh
Electrification 128 0.384 0.203 0.0749 0.971
Years of Schooling 128 3.724 0.758 2.278 6.245
Log Nighttime Lights 128 0.551 0.942 -1.880 3.084
Log Population Per Pixel 128 6.572 0.638 3.928 8.743
Cambodia
Electrification 316 0.186 0.244 0 0.996
Years of Schooling 316 2.971 1.214 0.331 7.321
Log Nighttime Lights 316 -3.207 2.250 -4.605 4.119
Log Population Per Pixel 316 4.599 1.589 0.300 10.78
Ecuador
Electrification 154 0.883 0.0971 0.510 0.995
Years of Schooling 154 6.070 1.256 3.133 9.663
Log Nighttime Lights 154 0.948 1.286 -2.848 3.694
Log Population Per Pixel 154 3.919 1.122 0.584 7.262
Ghana
Electrification 204 0.404 0.221 0.0404 0.950
Years of Schooling 204 4.003 1.536 0.789 8.024
Log Nighttime Lights 204 -0.619 1.866 -4.605 4.115
Log Population Per Pixel 204 4.568 1.120 2.239 8.967
Malawi
Electrification 446 0.0806 0.151 0 0.921
Years of Schooling 446 3.947 1.525 1.271 8.828
Log Nighttime Lights 446 -1.564 2.929 -4.605 4.086
Log Population Per Pixel 446 5.289 1.436 2.163 9.238
Mali
Electrification 94 0.0720 0.102 0.000388 0.757
Years of Schooling 94 0.825 0.597 0.162 4.282
Log Nighttime Lights 94 -3.681 1.400 -4.605 3.814
Log Population Per Pixel 94 2.597 1.542 -1.761 8.732
Zambia
Electrification 140 0.148 0.176 0 0.641
Years of Schooling 140 4.164 1.245 1.831 7.711
Log Nighttime Lights 140 -2.445 1.941 -4.605 3.740
Log Population Per Pixel 140 2.674 1.314 0.578 8.050
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Table C.2: Summary statistics for the sample at the regional level
Country Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Bangladesh
Years of Schooling 12 3.871 0.563 2.804 4.620
Electrification 12 0.414 0.159 0.197 0.675
Log Nighttime Lights 12 0.663 0.481 -0.229 1.456
Log Population Per Pixel 12 6.541 0.243 6.216 7.081
Cambodia
Years of Schooling 46 2.898 1.024 0.829 6.337
Electrification 46 0.205 0.191 0.0310 0.948
Log Nighttime Lights 46 -2.987 1.739 -4.605 3.177
Log Population Per Pixel 46 3.997 1.513 0.651 7.998
Ecuador
Years of Schooling 28 6.521 0.919 4.887 7.935
Electrification 28 0.873 0.104 0.612 0.977
Log Nighttime Lights 28 0.358 1.304 -2.702 2.075
Log Population Per Pixel 28 3.340 1.276 0.584 4.851
Ghana
Years of Schooling 20 4.145 1.629 1.616 7.462
Electrification 20 0.457 0.213 0.123 0.879
Log Nighttime Lights 20 -0.476 1.490 -3.011 2.716
Log Population Per Pixel 20 4.498 0.972 3.089 6.830
Malawi
Years of Schooling 48 3.650 0.927 2.080 5.982
Electrification 48 0.0381 0.0481 0.00612 0.289
Log Nighttime Lights 48 -1.767 1.049 -3.712 1.690
Log Population Per Pixel 48 4.556 0.696 3.122 6.029
Mali
Years of Schooling 16 1.200 1.050 0.395 4.282
Electrification 16 0.135 0.190 0.0165 0.757
Log Nighttime Lights 16 -2.634 2.504 -4.549 3.814
Log Population Per Pixel 16 2.917 2.515 -0.260 8.732
Zambia
Years of Schooling 16 4.549 1.200 3.108 6.972
Electrification 16 0.186 0.176 0.0304 0.567
Log Nighttime Lights 16 -2.113 1.503 -3.850 0.555
Log Population Per Pixel 16 2.627 0.960 1.131 4.383
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